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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Criminal justice rulings from the United States Supreme Court’s 
2013–2014 term are likely to be overshadowed in public discussions by 
debates concerning the Court’s two landmark five-to-four decisions in other 
policy spheres. 1  In one, a narrow majority exempted family-owned 
companies, based on the religious objections of the companies’ owners, from 
providing certain types of otherwise required health coverage.2 In the other, 
                                                 
*  Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, Case 
Western Reserve University; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 1999, Washington 
University, St. Louis. 
*  Associate Professor of Sociology, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, 
University of Akron; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 2004, Washington University, 
St. Louis. 
*  Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., 1980, Harvard 
University; M.Sc., 1981, University of Bristol (England); J.D., 1984, University of Tennessee; 
Ph.D., 1988, University of Connecticut. 
1 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rejects Contraceptives Mandate for Some 
Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/us/hobby-
lobby-case-supreme-court-contraception.html?_r=0 ; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Overall Political Donation Cap, N.Y.TIMES, (April 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/04/03/us/politics/supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-contributions.html. 
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
1
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the same marginally-winning coalition struck down longstanding limits on 
the total amount of money one can contribute to candidates for federal office, 
political parties, and political action committees.3 In these salient cases the 
Court returned to the topics of the Affordable Care Act and campaign 
finance—issues for which the Justices rendered other, controversial decisions 
in recent years.4 
The latest Supreme Court Term lacked a blockbuster criminal justice 
case to match those in previous Roberts Court Terms.5 Bond v. United States 
appeared to be this type of case for the 2013–2014 Term, with potentially 
significant implications for the roles of federal and state governments in 
prosecuting crimes. 6  Political conservatives hoped Bond would rein in 
congressional authority to criminalize certain domestic acts as part of the 
implementation of an international treaty.7 The majority instead avoided a 
controversial ruling on Congress’s treaty power, deciding the case on more 
limited grounds.8 
Yet, several highlights from the past Term warrant a systematic 
examination of the Court decisions and individual voting patterns in criminal 
justice cases. For example, in 2013–2014 the Court ruled on issues 
consequential to most of society, such as privacy expectations given the 
                                                 
3 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). (In both 
Burwell and McCutcheon, the majority included Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy). 
4 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.., 26 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.) See Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding Congress’s power to enact most 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act, commonly called Obamacare); and Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from restricting political independent expenditures by corporations, associations, 
or labor unions). 
5 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (upholding a state’s 
practice of taking warrantless DNA samples from all suspects arrested for certain serious 
offenses); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (upholding 
suspicionless strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses before being placed in the 
general inmate population); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010) (incorporating 
individuals’ Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (finding that the sentencing of a juvenile offender to life without 
parole for a non-homicide crime violates the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407 (2008) (ruling that punishing the crime of rape of a child with the death sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (ruling 
that the prohibition on possessing handguns in the home in the District of Columbia violates 
the Second Amendment); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (ruling that the G.W. 
Bush administration’s use of military commissions to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
violates the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Geneva Conventions). 
6 Bond V. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
7 See, e.g., George F. Will, Carol Bond Case Showcases Government run Amok, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2013 (calling Bond “the most momentous case” of the Term); and U.S. 
Senator Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F., 93, at 95 (2014) (“How 
the Court resolves Bond could have enormous implications for our constitutional structure.”). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 169–197. 
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growing use of advanced technologies in our daily lives,9 as well as on 
questions directly involving a relatively small subset of the populace, such as 
what level of safeguards will be deemed sufficient when imposing death 
sentences on convicted individuals with developmental disabilities.10 As the 
Justices grappled with balancing concern for individuals’ rights with 
governmental efforts to control crime,11 several themes that emerged in prior 
years also characterized the 2013–2014 Term.12 However, the most striking 
feature from analyzing the Term’s criminal justice decisions and voting 
tendencies may be the number of atypical findings. As discussed in the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses to follow, some of these were unique 
developments for the Roberts Court era in the area of criminal justice.13 
II.  EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION MAKING 
During the 2013–2014 Term, the Supreme Court handed down fewer 
full, signed decisions on criminal justice issues—twenty-one—than in any of 
the previous eight Terms of the Roberts Court era.14 Yet, criminal justice 
                                                 
9 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
10 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
11 For an influential discussion of tensions arising from two competing value 
systems in criminal justice (the crime control and due process models), see Herbert Packer, 
Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
12 For example, Justice Kennedy’s place in the divided Court continues to make 
him especially influential, see infra note 55 and accompanying text, just as in the prior term it 
was noted that “statistics demonstrate that Justice Kennedy’s vote continues to be the most 
valuable one.” Adam Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme Court to the Right Step By Step, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/roberts-plays-a-long-
game.html?_r=0. 
13 See infra Parts II & III; see infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
14 Excluded from analyses in this Article are the Court’s per curiam rulings in 
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014); Martinez v. 
Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070 (2014); Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014). This does not 
count separately United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014), which was consolidated with 
Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). In each of the previous eight Terms, the Roberts Court decided, 
on average, about 28 criminal justice cases with full, signed opinions. The number of these 
decisions is as follows: 23 during the 2012–2013 Term; 29 in 2011–2012; 31 in 2010–2011; 
29 in 2009–2010; 33 in 2008–2009; 26 in 2007–2008; 22 in 2006–2007; and 30 in 2005–
2006. See Michael A. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2012–2013 United States 
Supreme Court Term, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 35, 38 (2014) [hereinafter 2012–2013 Term]; 
Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2011–2012 United States Supreme Court 
Term, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 239, 244 (2013) [hereinafter 2011–2012 Term]; Madhavi M. 
McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2010–2011 United States Supreme Court Term, 53 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 307, 312 (2011) [hereinafter 2010–2011 Term]; Michael A. McCall et al., 
Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term , 41 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 230 
(2011) [hereinafter 2009–2010 Term]; Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) [hereinafter 2008–
2009 Term]; Michael A. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007–
2008 Term, 36 S.U. L. REV. 33, 36–38 (2008) [hereinafter 2007–2008 Term]; Michael A. 
McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2006–2007 United States Supreme Court Term, 76 
3
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policy areas continued to figure prominently in the Court’s rulings15 as 37% 
of the cases decided during the 2013–2014 Term addressed key questions 
concerning the administration of justice and the rights of individuals drawn 
into contact with the criminal justice system, albeit on a historically small 
Supreme Court docket. 16 
Scholars who study judicial behavior often label decisions and 
Justices as being predominantly conservative or liberal.17 We adopt these 
                                                                                                                   
UMKC L. REV. 993, 995–96 (2008) [hereinafter 2006–2007 Term]; and Christopher E. Smith 
et al., Criminal Justice and the 2005–2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 495, 499 (2007) [hereinafter 2005–2006 Term]. 
15 See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s 
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1229–33 (2012) (showing over time the 
growing presence of criminal procedure and due process cases on the Court’s docket, decline 
in the frequency of certain other types of cases like economic ones, and a decrease in the total 
number of cases heard by the Court per Term); and Adam Liptak, In New Term, Supreme 
Court Shifts Focus to Crime and First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011), htt
p://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/us/supreme-court-turns-to-criminal-and-first-amendment-
cases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Now, criminal justice is at the heart of the court’s docket  
. . . ”). 
16 See Kedar Bhatia, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2013 and key takeaways, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (July 3, 2014, 9:00 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/final-stat-pack-
for-october-term-2013-and-key-takeaways-2/ (drawing on two different datasets to report that 
the two most recent Terms in which the Court decided fewer cases with signed opinions than 
in the 2013–2014 Term (67 cases) were the 2011–2012 Term (65) and the 1864–1865 Term 
(55)). See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking 
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1229–33 (2012) (showing over time the growing 
presence of criminal procedure and due process cases on the Court’s docket, decline in the 
frequency of certain other types of cases like economic ones, and a decrease in the total 
number of cases heard by the Court per Term); see also Adam Liptak, In New Term, Supreme 
Court Shifts Focus to Crime and First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, A17 (“Now, 
criminal justice is at the heart of the court’s docket…”). See Bhatia supra note 16 (noting that 
during the 2013–2014 Term, the Roberts Court handed down 73 merits opinions). We 
identified 27 decisions (37%) addressing important questions in the area of criminal justice. 
Of these 27 criminal justice cases, 21 were decided with full, signed opinions and are analyzed 
in this Article, five were per curiam decisions, and one was a criminal justice case that was 
consolidated with another. See infra Part III.A–D; see supra notes 15–16. The primary 
question addressed did not need to be a criminal justice issue for a case to be included in this 
study. Rather, the selection process involved reading all Court decisions for the Term to 
identify those raising key issues in the area of criminal justice, though other additional types 
of issues may have been addressed; supra Bhatia, at Signed Opinions (drawing on two 
different datasets to report that the two most recent Terms in which the Court decided fewer 
cases with signed opinions than in the 2013–2014 Term (67 cases) were the 2011–2012 Term 
(65) and the 1864–1865 Term (55)). Supra Bhatia, at Signed Opinions (drawing on two 
different datasets to report that the two most recent Terms in which the Court decided fewer 
cases with signed opinions than in the 2013–2014 Term (67 cases) were the 2011–2012 Term 
(65) and the 1864–1865 Term (55)). 
17 E.g., Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns, & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How 
Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SC. 74 (2011) (using cases 
with liberal outcomes that reversed lower court rulings to test the influence of public opinion 
on Supreme Court decisions); e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey 
A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1490–91 (2007) (documenting ideological movement among almost 
4
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labels, and throughout this Article categorize as “liberal” those decisions that 
are supportive of claims by the criminally accused or convicted.18 Decisions 
labeled as “conservative” are those favoring the government’s assertions of 
authority embodied in decisions and actions by police, prosecutors, and 
judges.19 These definitions follow those in the widely used Supreme Court 
Database, though we independently classified all individual votes and case 
outcomes analyzed here. 20 When cases presented Justices with questions in 
multiple issue areas, coding exclusively considered the criminal justice 
context.21 
Table 1 summarizes the Supreme Court’s criminal justice decisions 
from the 2013–2014 Term by the conservative/liberal direction of outcome 
and the size of the majority. A notable feature of the distribution is the 
unusually large percentage of cases ending without dissent. With all nine 
Justices agreeing in judgment in more than three of every five cases, this 
Term witnessed the highest portion of criminal justice cases decided 
unanimously during the Roberts Court era to date.22 However, other recent 
patterns caution against attributing this to factors such as a systematic shift in 
decision making processes on the Court that might signal an enduring trend. 
For example, just two years earlier, the Court posted the lowest rate of 
                                                                                                                   
all Justices as they become more liberal or conservative over time); Jeffery A. Segal & Albert 
D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SC. 
REV. 557 (1989) (using content analysis of newspaper editorials to estimate Justices’ 
ideological scores which are then compared to their voting trends); e.g. Christopher E. Smith, 
Justice John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 99 
(2010) (examining one of the areas that helped cast Stevens as leader of the Court’s liberal 
wing in criminal justice cases). 
18 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the 
Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base Project, 73 
JUDICATURE 103 (1989) (“Liberal decisions in the area of civil liberties are pro-person 
accused or convicted of crime, pro-civil liberties claimant or civil rights claimant, pro-
indigent, pro-[Native American] and anti-government in due process and privacy.”). 
19 Id. 
20 Harold J. Spaeth, et. al., Online Code Book, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, 
Version 2014 Release 01 (2014), http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation
.php?var=decisionDirection (last visited July 24, 2014). 
21 E.g., The Court held in McCullen v. Coakley that a state law establishing a 
buffer zone outside of abortion clinics violated the First Amendment. McCullen v. Coakley, 
134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). The decision is liberal with respect to the First Amendment, liberal 
with respect to criminal justice, and conservative with respect to abortion/reproductive rights. 
For purposes of this study, the decision is coded only in the context of invalidating a criminal 
law (liberal). 
22 The proportion of criminal justice cases decided without dissent during the 
2013–2014 Term jumps to over 70% (19 of 27) if the five per curium opinions are included, 
and if the consolidated cases are treated separately. See supra notes 18, 20. The Court handed 
down fourteen unanimous criminal justice rulings during the 2010–2011 Term (one more than 
during the 2013–2014 Term). However, no prior Term of the Roberts Court posted a higher 
percentage of criminal justice cases decided by a unanimous Court. See, 2012–2013 Term, 
supra note 14; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14; 2009–2010 
Term, supra note 14; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14; 2006–
2007 Term, supra note 14; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14. 
5
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unanimous decisions in criminal justice cases since at least the 1994–1995 
Term.23 Thus, it is likely that recent swings in the share of criminal justice 
cases decided unanimously are pushed more by the different grouping of 
issues heard in various Terms than by fundamental changes in the general 
level of agreement on the Court.24 
 
TABLE 1: 
Case Distribution by Vote and Liberal/Conservative Outcome in 
 U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions, 2013–2014 Term25 
 
Vote Liberal Conservative  Total 
9-0 5 8 13 (61.9%) 
8-1 0 0 0 (0.0%) 
7-2 1 0 1 (4.8%) 
6-3 0 3 3 (14.3%) 
5-4 1 3 4 (19.0%) 




The dominance of conservative rulings during the 2013–2014 Term, 
especially in those cases that most divided the high court, provides another 
striking characteristic of criminal justice rulings during the most recent 
Term. Some might predict this to be the norm based upon common 
depictions of the Court’s conservatism and current membership that includes 
five Justices usually portrayed as political conservatives.26 Yet, in past years 
the Roberts Court often produced a more balanced split in the number of its 
                                                 
23 See, 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 242. 
24 See, e.g., Thomas R. Hensley & Christopher E. Smith, Membership Change 
and Voting Change: An Analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s 1986–1991 Terms, 48 POL. RES. Q. 
837, 849–52 (1995) (explaining that changes in patterns of Supreme Court decisions are a 
function of different factors including changes in the nature of issues that the Court decided in 
specific Terms). 
25 See infra Part III.A–D. 
26 See, e.g., David Cole, The Roberts Court: What Kind of Conservatives? N.Y. 
REV. OF BOOKS BLOG (Oct. 7, 2013, 9:43 AM) http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013
/oct/07/roberts–court-what-kind-conservatives/ (describing the Roberts Court as “a 
confidently conservative institution” and predicting that in major cases in the 2013–2014 
Term, “the real question is not whether the conservatives will win, but how they win”); Adam 
Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html?pagewanted=all, (reporting on a 
statistical analysis of Court eras and noting that current members Roberts, Scalia, Alito and 
Thomas rank among the six most conservative Justices to sit on the Court since 1937, and that 
Kennedy is among the top ten); Joan Biskupic, Reshaped Supreme Court Charts New Era, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington
/judicial/2010-10-01-court01_ST_N.htm (“The court under Chief Justice John Roberts has 
pushed the law to the right”). 
6
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liberal and conservative criminal justice rulings.27 Moreover, in all but two of 
the previous eight Terms, five-member majorities have been more likely to 
favor claims of individual suspects, defendants, or convicted offenders than 
to support interests of justice system officials.28 The atypical distribution of 
decisions by direction of outcome during the 2013–2014 Term, then, further 
suggests the importance of examining the specific criminal justice issues 
considered by the Court this past year.29 
Table 2 presents the voting patterns for individual Justices along the 
liberal-conservative dimension, as well as the degree to which each Justice 
supported the majority position by direction of outcome. Unlike previous 
Terms, the voting tendencies do not reveal immediately the liberal and 
conservative wings of the Court; typically, Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Alito, Thomas, Scalia, and—to a lesser extent—Kennedy vote for 
conservative outcomes notably more often than do Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.30 The relative scarcity of non-unanimous criminal 
justice decisions in the 2013–2014 Term may have obscured this usually 
clear dividing line. It is presumably in non-unanimous decisions that the 
sincerest representations of judicial preferences are most likely to be 
expressed given that there is little need to compromise, at least not for the 
sake of unanimity.31 Thus, the reduced opportunity in the most recent Term 
to express such preferences likely compressed the ideological distance 
between the Justices. Notably, the only Justices to support both non-
unanimous liberal outcomes were those traditionally depicted as members of 
the Court’s liberal wing (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan),32 
and the more moderate conservative (Justice Kennedy).33 
                                                 
27 E.g., 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 38 (showing that 12 of the Court’s 
criminal justice decisions ended in a liberal outcome that Term while 11 could be 
characterized as conservative). 
28 Criminal justice cases ending in a five-to-four or five-to-three vote produced 
more conservative than liberal decisions during the 2008–2009 Term and during the 2006–
2007 Term. See 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 4; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 
995–96. In all other previous Terms of the Roberts Court, more liberal than conservative 
decisions were handed down by five-member majorities. See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 
14, at 38; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 244; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 312; 
2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 230; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 38; 2005–2006 
Term, supra note 14, at 499. 
29 See infra Part III. 
30 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 26 (placing the conservatism of Roberts, Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy, JJ. into historical context); and 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, 
at 247 (showing that Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ. each voted for conservative 
outcomes in more than 60% of non-unanimous criminal justice cases that Term, while the rate 
for Kennedy, J. was about 41%, and was less than 25% for Kagan, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Ginsburg). 
31 This logic extends to en banc courts more generally. See Christopher E. Smith, 
Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133, 134 (1990). 
32 See, e.g., Hannah Fairfield & Adam Liptak, A More Nuanced Breakdown of 
the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/
7
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TABLE 2: 
Voting Rates by Justice in Non-unanimous (and All) Criminal Justice 













Alito 87.5 (71.4) 62.5 (85.7) 5 of 6 (13 of 14) 0 of 2 (5 of 7) 
Thomas 75.0 (66.7) 50.0 (81.0) 4 of 6 (12 of 14) 0 of 2 (5 of 7) 
Kennedy 75.0 (66.7) 100.0 (100.0) 6 of 6 (14 of 14) 2 of 2 (7 of 7) 
Roberts 50.0 (57.1) 50.0 (81.0) 3 of 6 (11 of 14) 1 of 2 (6 of 7) 
Scalia 50.0 (57.1) 50 (81.0) 3 of 6 (11 of 14) 1 of 2 (6 of 7) 
Breyer 50.0 (57.1) 75.0 (90.5) 4 of 6 (12 of 14) 2 of 2 (7 of 7) 
Kagan 50.0 (57.1) 75.0 (90.5) 4 of 6 (12 of 14) 2 of 2 (7 of 7) 
Ginsburg 37.5 (52.4) 62.5 (85.7) 3 of 6 (11 of 14) 2 of 2 (7 of 7) 




Despite the compression of individual voting rates by direction of 
outcome, Justice Alito again distinguished himself as the most conservative 
member of the Court in criminal justice cases. 35  The 2013–2014 Term, 
however, did record Alito’s first departure from a conservative majority in a 
criminal justice case since arriving on the Court in 2006. When the majority 
in Abramski v. United States36 ruled against a man who purchased a firearm 
for another buyer but did not disclose that intent on a federal form, Alito 
                                                                                                                   
upshot/a-more-nuanced-breakdown-of-the-supreme-court.html?_r=0 (last visited July 26, 
2014). 
33 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 
40–1 (2008). 
34 Data regard the eight non-unanimous and twenty-one total criminal justice 
cases analyzed in this Article. See infra Part III.A–D. 
35 Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice Samuel Alito, NY TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 
20, 2011, MM13 (drawing on statistical analysis to report that Alito “has ruled for the defense 
in only 17% of the criminal cases he has heard since he joined the court, putting him to the 
right of Roberts, Scalia, Thomas—and every other justice of the past 65 years other than 
William Rehnquist . . . .”; and 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at n32 (“In each Term from 
2006–2007 through 2010–2011, Justice Alito posted the most conservative voting record in 
criminal justice cases . . . .”). 
36 Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014). 
8
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joined Scalia’s dissenting opinion along with Roberts and Thomas.37 The 
case also marks the first time these four conservative Justices dissented from 
a conservative criminal justice decision, 38  and illustrates the occasional 
discrepancy between the use of conservative and liberal labels here versus in 
common political discourse. Because the decision in Abramski is pro-law 
enforcement and anti-defendant, it is coded as conservative. However, 
support among the broader population for restrictions on gun purchases and 
ownership is stronger among political liberals. 
All members of the Court except Justice Sotomayor voted to support 
a conservative outcome in at least half of the criminal justice cases decided 
this Term.39 Some maintain Sotomayor’s liberalism in the area of criminal 
justice40 and her general approach to cases reflect a sensitivity she developed 
through life experiences to certain claims against government.41 Sotomayor’s 
lone conservative vote in a non-unanimous criminal justice case was also 
cast in the category-defying, Abramski case.42 
The most recent Term chronicled another first: it is the first Term in 
which any Justice on the Roberts Court voted on the winning side of every 
criminal justice case. 43  Justice Kennedy’s participation in all twenty-one 
majorities that handed down criminal justice rulings during the 2013–2014 
                                                 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 305–317 for a fuller discussion of Abramski. 
38 For summaries of all five-member majority, criminal justice decisions on the 
Roberts Court that we identified (none of which ended with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito 
in dissent from a conservative outcome). See 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 55–74; 
2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 267–80; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 334–42; 
2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 273–81; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 30–45; 2007–
2008 Term, supra note 14, at 71–85; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 1025–42; and 2005–
2006 Term, supra note 14, at 529–45. 
39 See supra Table 2. 
40 See, e.g., 2012–13 Term, supra note 14, at 40 (showing Justices Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg tied in having the most liberal voting record in criminal justice cases decided that 
Term). 
41 For examples of those asserting that Sotomayor’s experiences (e.g., a Latina, 
growing up in a housing project, prosecutor) have given her a heightened appreciation for the 
‘real-world’ consequences of criminal justice decisions and of failures in the criminal justice 
system, see Rachel E. Barkow, Justice Sotomayor and Criminal Justice in the Real World, 
YALE L.J. FORUM (Mar. 24, 2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and-
criminal-justice-in-the-real-world; Veronica Couzo, Sotomayor’s Empathy Moves the Court a 
Step Closer to Equitable Adjudication, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (2013); Linda 
Greenhouse, The Roberts Court, Version 4.0, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Oct. 2, 2010, 6:16 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/the-roberts-court-version-4-0/. 
42 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014). 
43 For tables and case summarizes demonstrating that no Justice has been a 
member of all criminal justice decisions in previous Terms of the Roberts Court, see; 2012–
2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 247; 2010–2011 Term, 
supra note 14, at 327–42; 2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 234; 2008–2009 Term, supra 
note 14, at 7; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 50–85; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 
1015–42; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 519–45. 
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Term furthers his reputation as an especially influential member of the high 
court.44 
Interagreement rates of paired Justices are presented in Tables 3 and 
4. Judicial scholars have drawn upon interagreement tables for decades to 
reveal shared voting tendencies among Justices and to identify potential 
voting blocs.45 Classifying Justices as part of a bloc does not indicate they 
trade votes or even consciously seek to vote with one another. Instead, 
frequently supporting the same outcome suggests that members of a voting 
bloc may share certain judicial philosophies and policy preferences.46 
A bloc exists when the average agreement scores for a set of justices 
exceeds a threshold known as the Sprague criterion. 47  This criterion is 
calculated by subtracting the average agreement score for the entire Court 
from one hundred; the result is divided by two and added to the Court 
average. That sum is the threshold level for defining a voting bloc.48  A 
notable advantage of the Sprague criterion is that when the general rate of 
agreement is high on the Court—such as in 2013–2014 criminal justice 
cases49—the calculation raises the threshold which avoids confusing broader 





                                                 
44 See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 33; Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns 
Supreme on Court: With O’Connor’s Departure, Sole Swing Voter Wields His Moderating 
Force, WASH. POST, July 2, 2006, A6; Richard Wolf, From gay marriage to voting law, 
Kennedy is the key, USA TODAY, (11:31 PM, June 27, 2013) http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supreme-court-athony-kennedy-race-voting-abortion-gay-
marriage/2161701/;Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle 
Court’s 5 to 4 Decisions Underscore His Power, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, A1. 
45 See, e.g., GARRISON NELSON, PATHWAYS TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: FROM 
THE ARENA TO THE MONASTERY 171–72 (2013) (noting The Harvard Review’s long history of 
using interagreement rates in summarizing Supreme Court Terms). 
46 We coded agreement with respect to judgment only. Occasionally, this 
approach can overestimate the degree of agreement between Justices. For example, four 
Justices dissented in Paroline v. United States. See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 
(2013). While Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented to assert that flaws in the existing law 
did not permit victim restitution in that case, Sotomayor dissented alone to argue the victim 
was entitled to more than the majority concluded. See infra notes 290–304, and accompanying 
text for a fuller discussion of Paroline. For purposes of Tables 3 and 4, however, Sotomayor is 
coded as agreeing with the other dissenters, if only in terms of their opposition to the majority 
opinion; See, e.g., John M. Scheb II, Colin Glennon, & Hemant Sharma, A Statistical Look at 
the Supreme Court’s 2009 Term, 7 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y, 7, 12–15 (2011). 
47 JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
CASES IN FEDERALISM, 1889–1959, 7 (1968). 
48 Id. at 51–61. 
49 See supra Table 1 (providing the percentage of cases ending in a unanimous 
decision). 
50 Saul Brenner, Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Comparison of 
the Original Vote on the Merits with the Final Vote, 22 JURIMETRICS 287, 289–90 (1982). 
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TABLE 3: 
Interagreement Percentages for Paired Justices in U.S. Supreme  Court 
Criminal Justice Decisions, 2013–2014 Term51 
 
 Scalia Thomas Alito Kennedy Breyer Sotomayor Kagan Ginsburg 
Roberts 90.5 90.5 85.7 81.0 81.0 76.2 71.4 66.7 
Scalia  90.5 85.7 81.0 71.4 76.2 81.0 76.2 
Thomas   95.2 81.0 71.4 66.7 71.4 66.7 
Alito    85.7 76.2 61.9 76.2 71.4 
Kennedy     90.5 76.2 90.5 85.7 
Breyer      85.7 81.0 85.7 
Sotomayor       85.7 90.5 
Kagan        95.2 
        
Court mean: 80.4 
Sprague criterion: 90.2 
Voting blocs: 
 Roberts-Scalia-Thomas: 90.5 
 Alito-Thomas-Scalia: 90.5* 
 Alito-Roberts-Thomas: 90.5* 
 Ginsburg-Sotomayor-Kagan: 90.5* 
 Ginsburg-Kagan-Kennedy: 90.5* 
(*) denotes that the average agreement of the group meets the threshold 
though one interagreement pair within the subset falls a fraction of a case 
below the criterion. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Two pairs of Justices (Ginsburg and Kagan; Alito and Thomas) tied 
for the highest interagreement rate for the 2013–2014 Term. Members of 
each dyad agreed regarding judgment in all but one criminal justice case.52 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Justices with the most liberal (Sotomayor) and 
                                                 
51 Percentages are rounded. Data regard the 21criminal justice cases analyzed in 
this Article. Assessments regard majority and dissenting positions relative to the Court’s 
judgment only. Positions are not distinguished further by concurring opinions. See infra Part 
III.A–D. 
52 Kagan was in the majority while Ginsburg dissented in White v. Woodall. 
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (concerning sentencing jury instructions regarding a 
convicted man’s decision not to testify during the penalty phase of his trial). Alito was in the 
majority while Thomas dissented in Paroline v. United States. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1710 
(regarding restitution to a victim of child pornography). 
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the most conservative voting records (Alito)53 were the most polarized from 
an interagreement perspective. However, never before during the Roberts 
Court era have two Justices failed to agree on every non-unanimous, criminal 
justice decision like Justices Alito and Sotomayor in the 2013–2014 Term.54 
The paucity of non-unanimous decisions during the most recent Term 55 
cautions against overstating this finding, though Alito and Sotomayor agreed 
in only one non-unanimous decision during the 2012–2013 Term when given 
far more opportunities. 
 
TABLE 4: 
Interagreement Percentages for Paired Justices in U.S. Supreme Court 
Criminal Justice Non-unanimous Decisions, 2013–2014 Term56 
 
 Scalia Thomas Alito Kennedy Breyer Sotomayor Kagan Ginsburg 
Roberts 75.0 75.0 62.5 50.0 50.0 37.5 25.0 12.5 
Scalia  75.0 62.5 50.0 25.0 37.5 50.0 37.5 
Thomas   87.5 50.0 25.0 12.5 25.0 12.5 
Alito    62.5 37.5 0.0 37.5 25.0 
Kennedy     75.0 37.5 75.0 62.5 
Breyer      62.5 50.0 62.5 
Sotomayor       62.5 75.0 
Kagan        87.5 
    
 
Court mean: 48.6 
Sprague criterion: 74.3 
Voting blocs: 
 Roberts-Scalia-Thomas: 75.0 
 Alito-Thomas-Scalia: 75.0* 
 Alito-Roberts-Thomas: 75.0* 
 Ginsburg-Sotomayor-Kagan: 75.0* 
                                                 
53 See supra Table 2 (showing Alito with the Term’s highest conservative voting 
percentage and Sotomayor with the lowest). 
54 See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 42; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 
250; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 320; 2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 236; 2008–
2009 Term, supra note 14, at 10; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 43–4; 2006–2007 Term, 
supra note 14, at 1000–1; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 508. 
55 See supra Table 1. 
56 Percentages are rounded. Data regard the eight non-unanimous criminal justice 
cases analyzed in this Article. Assessments regard majority and dissenting positions relative to 
the Court’s judgment only. Positions are not distinguished further by concurring opinions. See 
infra Part III.B–D. 
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 Ginsburg-Kagan-Kennedy: 75.0* 
(*) denotes that the average agreement of the group meets the threshold 
though one interagreement pair within the subset falls a fraction of a case 
below the criterion. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
The Term produced evidence of several larger voting blocs. The 
ideological wings of the Court are a bit clearer here than in Table 2. Three 
different subsets of Justices from the conservative wing of the Court—each 
with three members—voted in the same direction with respect to judgment 
sufficiently often for each to be considered a voting bloc.57 Also, for the 
second consecutive year, the three women on the Court routinely found 
themselves on the same side of criminal justice issues.58 
Much more remarkable is Justice Kennedy’s presence in a voting 
bloc with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan. Although Kennedy’s occasional 
support for liberal outcomes as a “median” and “swing” Justice are well 
documented, he has never before been part of a criminal justice voting bloc 
during the Roberts Court era with multiple members of the liberal wing.59 
This unique development and other atypical patterns noted previously 
underscore the value of examining more closely the Court’s criminal justice 
decisions of the 2013–2014 Term. 
                                                 
57 See supra Tables 3 and 4 (indicating the following conservative voting blocs: 
Roberts-Scalia-Thomas; Alito-Thomas-Scalia; and Alito-Roberts-Thomas). One four-member 
subset including Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito might be considered a near-bloc with a 
mean interagreement rate of 89.7 in all criminal justice cases and 72.9 in non-unanimous ones. 
58 See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 42 (showing that the only bloc of three 
or more Justices in criminal justice cases that Term was that of Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan). See also, Fairfield & Liptak, supra note 32 (reporting on all Supreme Court cases and 
noting, “In the term that ended in June 2013, the three women on the court—Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan—were tightly bunched on the left side of 
the array. They cast liberal votes around 70% of the time.”). 
59 See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 33, at 40–1 (“. . . there are super 
medians—Justices so powerful that they are able to exercise significant control over the 
outcome and content of the Court’s decisions. Justice Kennedy was one [in the 2006–2007 
Term]. . . .”); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY 
ON LIBERTY 4 (2009) (asserting that “there is no escaping the fact that for most of his two 
decades on the Supreme Court Kennedy has been the model of a median justice.”); and 
Barnes, supra note 44 (quoting Richard Dieter, “So Justice Kennedy is even more of an 
important swing vote than he was before”); See, 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 42; 2011–
2012 Term, supra note 14, at 249–50; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 317, 320; 2009–
2010 Term, supra note 14, at 235–36; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 9–10; 2007–2008 
Term, supra note 14, at 43–4; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 1000–01; and 2005–2006 
Term, supra note 14, at 507–08. 
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III.  CASE DECISIONS 
A.  Unanimous Decisions 
As noted, the Court handed down an unusually large percentage of 
criminal justice decisions without dissent during the 2013–2014 Term.60 All 
four criminal justice opinions authored by the Chief Justice this Term were 
unanimous rulings, as were both opinions written by Justice Sotomayor and 
the only criminal justice opinion authored by Justice Breyer.61 We begin with 
a discussion of the eight conservative, unanimous rulings.62 
The Court’s conservative, unanimous ruling in Burt v. Titlow refused 
habeas relief under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA).63 In this ineffective assistance of counsel case, the Court held that 
federal courts should use the “doubly deferential” standard which gives the 
benefit of doubt to defense counsel and to lower court rulings regarding 
counsel competence, and advises appellate courts to assume counsel’s 
performance was adequate absent indicators otherwise. 64  Here, the Court 
held that the federal court should have accepted the state court’s finding that 
counsel was not ineffective.65 According to Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
(for all Justices except Justice Ginsburg who concurred in judgment),66 the 
AEDPA does not permit federal courts to “so casually second-guess the 
decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.”67 
The Court also made the use of deadly force to stop high speed car 
chases easier to justify in Plumhoff v. Rickard, another conservative ruling 
authored by Justice Alito.68 Police chased Donald Rickard and his passenger 
for several miles.69 Police attempted to stop Rickard’s car using a rolling 
roadblock but were unsuccessful.70 Police pursued Rickard through traffic at 
speeds that at times surpassed 100 miles per hour.71 He was nearly cornered 
in a parking lot where he continued to attempt escape.72 At that point, police 
                                                 
60 See supra note 22, and accompanying text. 
61 Robers v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1854 (2014); United States v. Apel, 134 S. 
Ct. 1144 (2014); Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077 (2014); McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2518; Riley, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2473; Kansas v. Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 596 (2013); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 
1405 (2014); 
62 Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 
(2014); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Cheever, 134 S. Ct. at 596; Apel, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1144 (2014); Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1405; Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 
(2014); Robers, 134 S. Ct. at 1854 (2014). 
63 Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 17–8. 
64 Id. at 13. 
65 Id. at 15–7. 
66 Id. at 24 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in judgment). 
67 Id. at 13. 
68 Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2012 (2014). 
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exited their cruisers and first fired three shots at Rickard’s car.73 When those 
failed to halt Rickard, police fired several more shots, eventually killing both 
Rickard and the passenger. 74  Rickard’s surviving daughter brought suit 
against the officers and other government officials asserting they had 
violated her father’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using 
excessive force.75 The officers made a claim of qualified immunity but the 
district court refused to grant them summary judgment.76 The district court 
and the circuit court found a Fourth Amendment violation and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.77 
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito held that the officers did not 
violate constitutional protections nor did they violate clearly established 
law.78 First, Alito noted that Fourth Amendment excessive force cases are 
governed by determining if the police’s actions were excessive given the 
totality of the circumstances from the viewpoint of a “reasonable officer on 
the scene.”79 Rickard’s daughter argued that the standard was violated twice 
because the officers did not have the right to use deadly force to stop the 
chase80 and that they used excessive force by firing too many shots at the 
car.81 Alito found both arguments unpersuasive. He held that police can use 
deadly force to stop a chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders.82 
Further, Alito noted that if officers were authorized to use deadly force, the 
police do not have to stop until the threat is over.83 Since Rickard at no point 
attempted to surrender, the second round of shots were justified. 84  The 
presence of a passenger does not change the argument as Alito asserted it 
was Rickard and not the police who endangered the passenger.85 Finally, 
regarding the question of qualified immunity, Alito found that the police 
would have been entitled to immunity even if the Court had ruled the Fourth 
Amendment was violated because the police had not violated clearly 
established law.86 
The Court also handed down a conservative ruling protecting law 
enforcement from suits filed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents by asserting that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the law 
                                                 
73 Id. at 2018. 




78 Id. at 2021–22. 
79 Id. at 2020. 
80 Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 2021–22. 
83 Id. at 2022. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022–23. 
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enforcement officer in Walden v. Fiore.87 Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s 
opinion. 
In Kansas v. Cheever the Court ruled that court-ordered psychiatric 
examinations may be used by the state to rebut a defendant’s claim of 
intoxication without violating the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-
incrimination.88 In this case, Scott Cheever shot and killed a local sheriff 
following a night in which Cheever cooked and consumed 
methamphetamine. 89  Before the case proceeded to trial, Kansas’s death 
penalty scheme was deemed unconstitutional by the state high court. 90 
Unable to obtain a death sentence for Cheever, the state dismissed the 
charges and allowed federal prosecutors to charge Cheever under the Federal 
Death Penalty Act of 1994.91 Because Cheever indicated that he intended to 
introduce evidence that he was intoxicated during the commission of the 
murder thereby reducing his culpability, the Court ordered Cheever undergo 
a psychiatric evaluation consistent with Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.92 Eventually, the federal case was dismissed without prejudice.93 
By then, the United States Supreme Court had found Kansas’s death penalty 
procedures constitutional; Kansas decided to try Cheever in state court.94 
At trial, Cheever introduced expert testimony that his long-term drug 
use made him incapable of forming premeditation.95 The state, in rebuttal 
and over defense’s objections, introduced the psychiatric evaluation 
conducted during the federal trial. 96  Defense’s objection centered on the 
constitutional claim that the evaluation was not voluntary and thus its 
introduction violated Cheever’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.97 The trial court allowed the rebuttal testimony, the jury found 
Cheever guilty and recommended a death sentence and Cheever appealed.98 
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Cheever and United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.99 
Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor found that Cheever’s Fifth 
Amendments rights had not been violated. Justice Sotomayor noted that the 
Court had previously ruled in Estelle v. Smith that court-ordered psychiatric 
evaluations could not be used against a defendant when the defendant did not 
                                                 
87 Walden, 403 U.S. 388. 
88 Cheever, 134 S. Ct at 603. 





94 Cheever, 134 S. Ct. at 599. 
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initiate the evaluation or introduce psychiatric evidence herself.100 However, 
the Court clarified in Buchanan v. Kentucky that this type of testimony could 
be used as rebuttal evidence when the defendant introduced testimony related 
to a mental capacity defense.101 Reaffirming the ruling in Buchanan, the 
Court found the state may rebut a defendant’s mental state defense using 
court-ordered evaluations.102 
The Court also handed down a conservative ruling in United States 
v. Apel.103 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that for 
the purposes of federal law, individuals barred from military installments are 
barred from all areas under the commanding officers’ area of responsibility, 
including those designated free speech protest areas and parts of highways.104 
When defense counsel and noted constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky 
attempted to focus on First Amendment claims during oral argument, the 
Justices appeared more interested in the property ownership aspect of the 
case.105 
In United States v. Castleman the Court further defined the meaning 
of the words “physical force” in a unanimous, conservative ruling written by 
Justice Sotomayor. 106  Federal law holds that anyone convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is barred from obtaining or 
engaging in commercial activity related to fire arms and ammunition.107 A 
misdemeanor domestic violence offense is defined as one that “has, as an 
element, the use or attempted use of physical force.”108 James Castleman 
pleaded guilty to the state charge of “intentionally or knowingly causeing 
bodily injury to” the mother of his child.109 Years later, he was indicted by 
the federal government for trafficking weapons; he was charged with 
possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.110 Castleman argued that the federal law did not apply to 
him because his state crime did not involve physical force and, thus, was not 
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law. 111  Justice 
Sotomayor held that absent any other indications, Congress intended to use 
the common-law meaning of “force.”112 The common-law definition includes 
                                                 
100 Cheevers,134 S. Ct. at 600 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)). 
101 Id. at 601 (citing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423-24 (1987)). 
102 Id. at 602–03. 
103 Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 1144 (2014). 
104 Id. at 1153. 
105 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Dismissing Speech Claims, Justices Turn to Plain Line-
Drawing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, at A20. 
106 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1405. 





112 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410. 
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offensive touching and, under this definition of physical force, Castleman’s 
state conviction qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.113 
In Loughrin v. United States, a decision written by Justice Kagan, 
the Court ruled that the federal bank fraud statute did not require the 
government to prove the defendant intended to defraud a financial 
institution.114 Rather, a showing that the defendant intentionally engaged in 
criminal conduct to obtain property under control of the bank was sufficient 
to support the conviction.115 
In the final conservative criminal justice decision without dissent 
during the 2013–2014 Term, the Court clarified in Robers v. United States 
the obligations of convicted criminals under the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). 116 In this case, Benjamin Robers 
committed mortgage fraud by misrepresenting his income and intent to repay 
loans. He obtained approximately $470,000 worth of loans from banks, and 
when he failed to make the loan payments, the banks foreclosed and 
eventually sold the properties for about $280,000.117 When Robers failed to 
make the loan payments, the banks foreclosed and eventually sold the 
properties for about $280,000.118 Robers was ordered to pay restitution of 
about $220,000, the difference between the original loans and the sales prices 
minus fees.119 Robers appealed the restitution amount, arguing that when the 
banks foreclosed, part of their property was returned and, according to 
statute, the fair market value of the properties—which was higher than the 
amount for which the houses sold—should have been used to calculate 
restitution.120 In a decision written by Justice Breyer, the Court disagreed and 
held that the banks’ property in this regard was the loan amount rather than 
the collateral; thus, the actual sale prices should be used to calculate the 
restitution amount and not the market value of the homes at the time of 
foreclosure.121 
The Court handed down five unanimous, liberal decisions in 
criminal justice cases during the 2013–2014 Term. Interestingly, members of 
the Court’s conservative wing authored all five of these liberal decisions.122 
In an important liberal ruling that law professor Jeffrey Rosen called 
“a landmark decision translating the Fourth Amendment into a digital 
                                                 
113 Id. at 1413. 
114 Loughrin, 134 S. Ct. at 2389–90. 
115 Id. at 2390–91. 
116 Robers, 134 S. Ct. at 1854. 
117 Id. at 1856. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1857. 
121 Id. at 1858–59. 
122 Chief Justice Roberts authored Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077; McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 
2518; and Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Burrage v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014); and Justice Thomas authored the Court’s decision in Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
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age,”123 the Court ruled in Riley v. California that cell phones cannot be 
viewed by police under the incident to a valid arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement. 124  David Riley was arrested for possession of concealed 
weapons after being stopped for driving with expired registration tags.125 
During a search incident to the arrest, officers seized Riley’s smart phone.126 
A police officer specializing in gangs found information on the phone 
implicating Riley in gang activity.127 Based on this evidence, police filed 
additional charges regarding an earlier gang related shooting and other 
weapons charges. 128 Riley moved to suppress the evidence from the cell 
phone, holding that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because 
the search was not justified by exigent circumstances.129 Since the crimes 
were allegedly committed while involved in gang activity, the government 
sought and received an enhanced sentence.130 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s unanimous ruling and held 
the searches were invalid under the Fourth Amendment.131 Searches without 
a warrant must stem from one of the specific exceptions established by the 
Court. Here, the searches were conducted using the incident to a valid arrest 
exception.132 
But, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, searches incident to a valid arrest 
are predicated on either a need to ensure officer safety or to ensure that 
evidence will not be destroyed.133 As a result, searches incident to a valid 
arrest are limited by spatial considerations; officers may search a person and 
items within the person’s reach to both secure evidence and ensure safety. 134 
Chief Justice Roberts also noted that the Court later added that the 
reasonableness of searches of a person incident to an arrest was not 
                                                 
123 How the Supreme Court Changed America This Year, POLITICO MAG., July 1, 
2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-the-supreme-court-changed-ame
rica-this-year-108497.html#.U-fF3D8qv9o (Last visited Aug. 10, 2014). 
124 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473. Riley v. California was decided together with United 
States v. Wurie, No. 13-212. 
125 Id. at 2480. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 2481. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
131 In the companion case, Brima Wurie was arrested after officers observed what 
appeared to be a drug transaction. Upon arrest, officers seized two cell phones. One of those 
phones, a flip phone, received several phone calls from a location that was identified as “my 
house.” The police traced the number to an apartment, obtained a warrant, and eventually 
seized illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, a weapon, and money. Wurie moved to suppress the 
evidence from his apartment arguing that the evidence resulted from an illegal search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Both Riley and Wurie lost, the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases. Riley,134 S. Ct. at 2481-82. 
132 Id. at 2482. 
133 Id. at 2483 
134 Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
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dependent on the probability of finding evidence or weapons.135 Finishing his 
review of relevant precedents, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Court’s 
2009 decision in Arizona v. Gant recognized that the incident to an arrest 
exception allowed police to search cars “only when the arrestee is unsecured 
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”136 However, the attributes of car searches permitted the search of 
vehicles’ passenger compartments when it was reasonable to believe that 
evidence of the offense leading to the arrest might be discovered in the 
vehicle.137 
Applying these concepts to the search of a cell phone, Chief Justice 
Roberts recognized that cell phones are a pervasive part of American life and 
that that these technologies were “inconceivable” when the prior cases were 
decided.138 He and the Court refused to extend the Robinson decision to cell 
phones because cell phones contain an incredible amount of personal 
information and searches of them do not resemble the less intrusive physical 
searches justified in Robinson.139 Using Chimel, the Court noted further that 
obtaining information from cell phones does not aid in ensuring officer 
safety, and that preventing the destruction of evidence was an unpersuasive 
justification because once the cell phone is in police custody, the defendant 
cannot remove information from the phone.140 Finally, the Gant standard 
does not apply because the reduced expectation of privacy and increased 
needs of law enforcement regarding vehicles do not match the cell phone 
context.141 
The Chief Justice and the Court also noted that substantial privacy 
interests are jeopardized when cell phones are searched given the amount of 
personal information such phones often contain.142 The unanimous decision 
required police in these instances, generally, to obtain a warrant before 
accessing the information on a cell phone.143 
In another unanimous, liberal decision authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts, the Court upheld rights under the First Amendment in McCullen v. 
Coakley.144 The case deals with enforcement of a Massachusetts law that 
made it illegal to stand within thirty-five feet of any location where abortions 
are performed, other than hospitals. 145  The law contained exceptions for 
                                                 
135 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483–84 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 
(1973)). 
136 Id. at 2484 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 2485. 
140 Id. at 2485–86. 
141 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492. 
142 Id. at 2490. 
143 Id. at 2493. The Court made no distinction between the relatively simple flip 
phone used by Wurie and the more advanced smart phone used by Riley. 
144 McCullen,134 S. Ct. at 2518. 
145 Id. at 2526. 
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those with business within the location, but otherwise created a strict buffer 
zone. 146  Here, Eleanor McCullen, a “sidewalk counselor,” stood outside 
abortion clinics and offered those entering information regarding alternatives 
to abortion. McCullen argued that direct eye contact is necessary to make 
these encounters effective and the Massachusetts law significantly restricted 
her ability to counsel.147 Other sidewalk counselors made similar arguments 
and sued the state in 2008, arguing that the statute violated their First 
Amendment right to free speech.148 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts found that public 
spaces have long been regarded as areas available for the free discussion of 
ideas.149 As such, the government’s ability to limit speech on the public 
walkways is limited.150 Although the government can regulate the time, place 
and manner of speech, laws restricting speech must be content neutral and 
narrowly tailored to meet significant government interest.151 
Addressing first the neutrality of the law, Chief Justice Roberts held 
that the law is content neutral and thus did not need to be evaluated using the 
strict scrutiny standard.152 However, Chief Justice Roberts found the law was 
not narrowly tailored to meet significant government objectives.153 The law 
forced street counselors to stand far away from their intended subjects, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of their message.154 Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the law “burden[s] substantially more speech than necessary 
to achieve the Commonwealth’s asserted interests” of maintaining public 
safety.155 
In another case raising First Amendment issues, the Court’s ruling in 
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus held that an interest group could sue to 
enjoin enforcement of an Ohio law making it a crime to present certain false 
statements during an election before the group was prosecuted for violating 
the law. 156  Here, an organization called the Susan B. Anthony List 
characterized an Ohio congressman’s support for the Affordable Care Act as 
support for abortions funded at taxpayer expense.157 The congressman, Steve 
Driehaus, filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, asserting 
that the Anthony group had violated the Ohio law by making false 
statements.158 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 2527. 
148 Id. at 2528. 
149 Id. at 2529. 
150 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 2531–34. 
153 Id. at 2535. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 2537. 
156 Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2345. 
157 Id. at 2339. 
158 Id. 
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Driehaus lost his reelection bid and dropped the complaint, but 
Susan B. Anthony List filed suit in federal court arguing that the Ohio law 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by criminalizing speech.159 
Once the complaint by Driehaus was dismissed, Susan B. Anthony List 
amended the suit alleging that the Ohio law was unconstitutional as it had an 
impermissible and unconstitutional chilling effect on their rights to free 
speech, especially given the group’s intention to continue to make similar 
statements about other politicians in the future.160 
The lower federal courts, consolidating this case with another from 
the Coalition Opposed to Additional Taxing and Spending, held that the 
litigants failed to show actual harm for the purposes of standing and 
determinations of ripeness, and as a result, found the cases were not 
justiciable.161 
Justice Thomas—writing for a unanimous Court—reversed, and held 
that the litigants had shown sufficiently that the threat of prosecution 
impacted their behavior.162 Although the Court did not resolve the central 
question dealing with the constitutionality of criminalizing false statements 
during an election cycle, the ability of both groups to sue should ensure that 
this issue is addressed by the lower courts. 
In Burrage v. United States, the Court considered mandatory-
minimum sentences under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Joshua 
Banka died of a drug overdose after binging on multiple drugs, including 
heroin purchased from Marcus Burrage.163 Although the medical examiners 
could not determine if Banka would have lived but for the fact that he took 
heroin, and despite the determination that Banka died from “mixed-drug 
intoxication,” Burrage was sentenced to twenty years in prison for selling 
heroin to Banka under the CSA.164 Although the defense argued that the 
government had to show that the heroin was “but-for cause of death,” the 
trial court held instead that the government merely had to show that the 
heroin was a contributing factor to Banka’s death.165 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that Burrage could not be 
held liable for enhanced sentencing unless the heroin was the cause of 
Banka’s death.166 Since the medical experts could not determine if death 
would not have resulted without the heroin, the sentence enhancement did 
not apply. Also, Justice Scalia held that the jury must decide if the victim’s 
death was a foreseeable result of Burrage’s drug dealing.167 Justice Scalia 
held that based on past decisions, all findings that increase the mandatory 
                                                 
159 Id. at 2340. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 2340–41. 
162 Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2343–46. 
163 Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 881 at 885. 
164 Id. at 886. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 892. 
167 Id. at 887. 
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minimum sentences to which defendants are exposed must be submitted to a 
jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.168 
In perhaps the most awaited criminal justice decision of the term, 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court’s ruling in Bond v. United 
States.169 Although all nine Justices voted to overturn Bond’s conviction, 
three did so based on constitutional grounds far removed from the statutory 
arguments used by remaining six Court members. This has prompted some to 
classify the decision as unanimous while others characterize it as a six-to-
three vote.170 We list this as a unanimous liberal decision given that all nine 
Justices ruled in Bond’s favor. 
In 1997, the President signed and the Senate ratified the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-piling, and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.171 This treaty was not self-
executing and required congressional legislation to implement. In 1998, 
Congress passed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 
which prohibited any individual from knowingly using, developing or 
acquiring chemical weapons.172 The Implementation Act defined chemical 
weapons broadly as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life 
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to 
humans or animals . . .” when used for something other than peaceful 
purposes.173 
The case began in 2006 when Carol Ann Bond discovered that her 
husband and her best friend, Myrlinda Haynes, were having an affair that 
resulted in a pregnancy.174 Bond decided to get revenge by placing chemical 
irritants on Haynes’s car door, mailbox and door knob. 175  Although the 
chemicals used could be deadly, Bond’s undisputed intent was to cause 
Haynes discomfort.176 Haynes, however, saw the substance in each instance 
but one and avoided contact.177 On the one occasion that Haynes touched the 
irritant, she suffered a minor thumb burn which she treated by washing her 
hands.178 Although the local police failed to respond to Haynes complaints, 
federal postal inspectors placed surveillance cameras around Haynes’s home 
                                                 
168 Id. at 887 (citing Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). 
169 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077. 
170 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT 
COLLEGE OF LAW. http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_12_158 (treating the 
decision as six-to-three) (last visited Aug.10, 2014); Bond v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG. 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/bond-v-united-states-2/ (classifying the decision 
as unanimous) (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). 
171 Bond, 134 S.Ct. at 2083. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 2085. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083. 
177 Id. at 2085. 
178 Id. 
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and caught Bond placing the chemicals on Haynes’s mail and inside her car’s 
muffler.179 The federal government charged Bond with mail theft and with a 
violation of the federal Chemical Weapons Ban treaty through the 
Implementation Act. Bond pleaded guilty after reserving her ability to 
challenge the constitutionality of her arrest under the Implementation Act.180 
On appeal, Bond argued that the Implementation Act violated the 10th 
Amendment by encroaching on states’ rights.181 She furthered argued that 
her conduct was not covered under the treaty because the treaty intended to 
cover “warlike” activities and not the criminal conduct exhibited here.182 The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her arguments and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.183 
Writing for Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts avoided the constitutional questions 
surrounding Congress’s ability to implement non self-executing treaties on 
its domestic population by instead resolving the conflict on statutory 
grounds.184 When acts intended to implement treaties are passed, those acts 
must conform with the scheme of federalism the Constitution establishes. In 
order to assume that Congress intended to reach purely local crimes and 
interfere with the states’ policing powers, there must be clear indication of 
that intent within the statute. Finding none, Roberts concluded that Congress 
did not intend to cover local crimes.185 
Further, Roberts noted that a fair reading of the Implementation Act 
indicated it is not as broad as prosecutors in this case asserted. Rather, 
Roberts noted there is a large difference between using a chemical weapon 
and using a “chemical in a way that caused some harm.”186 When taken in 
that light, the chemicals used here, while certainly used to cause harm, were 
not used in a situation that most would consider chemical warfare and, as 
such, were not covered by the Implementation Act. 187  Nor would the 
spreading of chemical irritants on a mailbox, with the intent to cause a rash, 
be considered a warlike activity conducted during “combat.”188 Although use 
of the same chemicals to poison the city’s water would be considered a 
chemical weapons attack and thus could be prosecuted using the 
Implementation Act, Bond’s situation is so far removed from this scenario 
                                                 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 2085–6. 
181 Id. at 2086. 
182 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086. 
183 Id. This was the second time the Court granted certiorari regarding these 
events. The Court previously ruled in 2011 that individuals and not just states have standing to 
raise Tenth Amendment challenges to federal law. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. _____ 
(2011).  
184 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. 
185 Id. at 2088–91. 
186 Id. at 2090. 
187 Id. at 2091. 
188 Id. at 2090–91. 
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that to using the Implementation Act to cover her conduct exceeds 
congressional intent.189 
Chief Justice Roberts further rejected the government’s 
interpretation of what constitutes chemical weapons. Roberts noted that the 
government’s definition would render “everything from the detergent under 
the kitchen sink to the stain remover in the laundry room” chemical 
weapons. 190  This broad reading is not consistent with what the average 
person considers to constitute a chemical weapon.191 
In short, Roberts’s decision relied a great deal on a ‘I-know-it-when-
I-see-it’ type of analysis holding that the average person understands 
chemical weapons to cover, for instance, the use of mustard gas on enemy 
troops or on a domestic population for the purposes of terrorism, but would 
not recognize Bond’s behavior as anything more than “an act of revenge 
born of romantic jealousy.” 192  By ruling that the prosecution of Bond 
exceeded the scope of the Implementation Act as intended by Congress, 
Roberts and the majority overturned Bond’s conviction while avoiding the 
controversial issues related to federalism and Congress’s treaty powers.193 
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice 
Thomas and in part by Justice Alito.194 Scalia agreed with the majority that 
Bond’s conviction must be overturned, but based his argument instead on 
constitutional grounds holding that Congress exceeded its authority by 
passing the Implementation Act in the first place. 195  Scalia began by 
asserting that Bond’s behavior was covered by the Implementation Act. 
Bond used chemicals for non-peaceful purposes with the intent to cause 
injury, satisfying the mandates of the Act.196 Because the Act covers Bond’s 
actions, the question the Court should have addressed is whether Congress 
has the ability to pass sweeping legislation that provides the legislature with 
the type of policing powers generally reserved to the states, and then apply 
legislation to local criminal activity.197 
After mocking the majority’s interpretation of the Implementation 
Act as not covering Bond’s actions, Scalia turned to the constitutional issue. 
Here, Scalia took issue with Court’s 1920 ruling in Missouri v. Holland198 
that held the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass 
legislation to implement valid treaties.199 Holland’s landmark ruling could be 
interpreted as providing Congress enormous power to implement 
                                                 
189 Id. at 2091. 
190 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091. 
191 Id. at 2090. 
192 Id. at 2090–91. 
193 Id. at 2092–93. 
194 Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
195 Id. at 2099. 
196 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094. 
197 Id. 
198 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
199 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098. 
25
McCall et al.: The 2013-2014 United States Supreme Court Term
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015
386 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:361 
international treaties in the domestic sphere. For example, “By negotiating a 
treaty and obtaining the requisite consent of the Senate, the President…may 
endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independent of the 
powers enumerated in Article I.”200 
Scalia found fault with such a conceptualization. Instead, Scalia 
argued that Congress has the ability to make all laws necessary and proper 
for making treaties but, because treaty implementation in not one of 
Congress’s enumerated powers, not for executing them.201  The power to 
make treaties is not synonymous with the power to implement those treaties 
and the use of Holland, according to Scalia, to treat the two activities as both 
falling under Congress’s implied powers conflicts with constitutional limits 
on federal authority. 202 
Justice Scalia warned that if the treaty making power were not 
limited based on its subject matter, Congress would be able to regulate 
citizens’ activities through treaty implementation by obtaining policing 
powers generally left to the states.203 For example, if Congress wanted to 
again ban the possession of guns near schools—something the Court ruled in 
United States v. Lopez was beyond Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause—a treaty could be ratified with another nation establishing that 
neither nation would allow the bringing of weapons to a school.204 Congress 
then could pass a law implementing that treaty and circumvent Lopez.205 
Seeing this type of congressional activity as a violation of the principles of 
federalism, Justice Scalia found the use of the Implementation Act against 
Bond to be unconstitutional.206 
Justice Thomas also filed an opinion concurring in judgment that 
was joined in full by Justice Scalia and in part by Justice Alito.207 Justice 
Thomas wrote separately to express his view “that the Treaty Power is itself 
a limited federal power” in addition to limits on Congress’s authority under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.208 Justice Thomas closes by emphasizing 
the need for the Court to address the bounds of the Treaty Power given the 
appropriate case, and seems to signal to interested parties his willingness to 
take up this task if the issue is brought to the Court.209 
Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in judgment also asserted that the 
issue in this case regarded the constitutionality of the Implementation Act.210 
Justice Alito maintained that any reading of the Convention that “obligate[s] 
                                                 
200 Id. at 2099 (quoting Lawrence Tribe). 
201 Id. at 2098–89. 
202 Id. at 2099–2100. 
203 Id. at 2099–2101. 
204 Id. at 2100 (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). 
205 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2100. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
206 Id. at 2102. 
207 Id. at 2102. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
208 Id. at 2102–03. 
209 Id. at 2110–11. 
210 Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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the United States to enact domestic legislation criminalizing conduct of the 
sort at issue in this case, which typically is the sort of conduct regulated by 
the States . . . exceeds the scope of the treaty power.”211 Thus, all three 
Justices concurring in judgment would reverse Bond’s conviction but would 
do so based on constitutional grounds rather than on a reading of statutory 
intent. 
B.  Seven-to-Two Decision 
The 2013–2014 Term marked the first Term during the Roberts 
Court era in which no criminal justice case was decided with a single 
dissent,212 and for the first time since the 2006–2007 Term, only one ended 
in a seven-to-two vote.213 In the sole criminal justice case decided seven-to-
two this Term, the outcome favored the criminally convicted. 
Specifically, the Court’s ruling in Rosemond v. United States214 held 
that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the crime of aiding 
and abetting. Justus Rosemond and one other male and a female were 
involved in a drug deal during which either Rosemond or the other male fired 
a weapon. 215  Because the identity of the shooter was in dispute, the 
government charged Rosemond both with using a gun in the commission of a 
drug crime and with aiding and abetting the use of a gun during a drug 
offense. 216  The trial court judge instructed the jury that they could find 
Rosemond guilty of aiding and abetting if “(1) the defendant knew his cohort 
used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime, and (2) the defendant knowingly 
and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime.”217 The jury convicted 
using these instructions and Rosemond appealed.218 
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kagan and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and 
Sotomayor in full, and by Justice Scalia in part, held that the jury instructions 
were faulty. 219  The Court noted that a defendant must have advance 
knowledge that an accomplice carried a firearm to the planned illegal 
activity.220 Without that finding, the defendant cannot have knowingly aided 
the use of a firearm. The Court’s decision provides a much needed 
                                                 
211 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring). 
212 See 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 38; 2011–2012 Term, supra note 14, at 
244; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 312; 2009–2010 Term, supra note 14, at 230; 2008–
2009 Term, supra note 14, at 4; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 38; 2006–2007 Term, 
supra note 14, at 994; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 499. 
213 See 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 994. 
214 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). 
215 Id. at 1243. 
216 Id. at 1243–44. 
217 Id. at 1244. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 1242. 
220 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249. 
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clarification of the law of aiding and abetting given the conflicting 
interpretations among the circuit courts. 221  Here, the jury’s verdict was 
vacated and the case remanded.222 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. Although Alito agreed with much of the 
Court’s analysis, he disagreed with the notion that the burden of proof falls 
with the government to show that the defendant had prior knowledge of the 
presence of a firearm at the crime.223 
C.  Six-to-Three Decisions 
The Court handed down three decisions ending in a six-to-three vote 
during the 2013–2014 Term.224 All three resulted in a conservative outcome 
from which Justice Sotomayor dissented. 
The Court held in Kaley v. United States that when assets have been 
seized before trial in response to a grand jury’s indictment, defendants do not 
have the right to contest the grand jury’s probable cause determination. 225 
The defendants were accused of selling stolen medical equipment. Based on 
a grand jury’s indictment, the government seized the defendants’ assets, 
including those intended to be used to pay legal fees. 226  Defendants 
challenged the seizure and attempted to re-litigate the probable cause 
determination by the grand jury. 227  Writing for Justices Thomas, Scalia, 
Alito, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, Justice Kagan found they had no right to do 
so.228 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, 
dissented,229 arguing that defendants have the right to challenge forfeiture, 
especially where those funds are intended to pay for legal counsel.230 Roberts 
wrote that the assistance of counsel, “In many ways…is the most precious 
right a defendant has, because it is his attorney who will fight for the other 
rights the defendant enjoys.”231 This marks the first criminal justice case in 
which Chief Justice Roberts dissented when all of his fellow conservative 
colleagues (Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Kennedy) were in the 
majority.232 
                                                 
221 Id. at 1245. 
222 Id. at 1252. 
223 Id. at 1252–53 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
224 Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 1126 (2014); and White, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014). 
225 Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1090. 
226 Id. at 1095–96. 
227 Id. at 1096. 
228 Id. at 1105. 
229 Id. at 1105 (2014) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
230 Id. at 1105–6. 
231 Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1107. 
232 In only one other criminal justice case—Danforth v. Minnesota—has Chief 
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White v. Woodall also resulted in a conservative, six-to-three 
ruling. 233  The case addressed Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination during the penalty phase of a capital case. 
Robert Woodall raped and killed a teenage girl. 234  Faced with 
considerable evidence of his guilt, Woodall pleaded guilty to the charges and 
proceeded to sentencing. 235  Woodall produced witnesses arguing for 
mitigation but he did not testify during the sentencing phase of the trial.236 
He then requested jury instructions indicating that the jury should not draw 
negative inferences from his failure to testify.237 The trial court judge denied 
the request and Woodall eventually filed for federal habeas relief arguing 
that failure to give the jury instructions regarding his lack of testimony 
violated his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.238 
Justice Scalia, writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, 
Thomas, Kennedy, and Kagan, found no Fifth Amendment violation. Rather, 
Scalia noted that just because a defendant is entitled to no-adverse-inference 
jury instructions during the guilt phase of a trial, there is no such entitlement 
during the penalty phase. 239  The Sixth Circuit’s ruling that the Fifth 
Amendment had been violated was unjustified because the state court had 
not operated against clearly established federal law because the Court 
previously had not addressed directly the question here.240 
Justice Breyer wrote for Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg in 
dissent. 241  Breyer asserted that the Court’s rulings that a no-adverse-
inference instruction is necessary at the penalty phase of a trial were well-
defined and, consequently, the state court had violated clearly established 
federal law.242 
In another conservative ruling prompting three dissenting votes, the 
Court refused to extend its holding in Georgia v. Randolph and allowed the 
search of a tenant’s home over the prior objections of another tenant who 
was not physically present during the search. 243 In the case of Fernandez v. 
California,244 Walter Fernandez was suspected of being involved in a gang-
related robbery.245 Police were informed that one of the suspects (Fernandez) 
had run into an apartment and a few minutes later police heard screaming 
                                                                                                                   
Danforth, Justice Kennedy joined Roberts’s dissent. 552 U.S. 264 (2008) (Roberts, J. 
dissenting).  
233 White, 134 S. Ct. at 1697. 
234 Id. at 1700–01. 




239 White, 134 S. Ct. at 1703. 
240 Id. at 1702, 1707. 
241 Id. at 1707 (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
242 Id. at 1710. 
243 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
244 Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1126. 
245 Id. at 1130. 
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from that apartment.246 Police found Roxanne Rojas inside the apartment. 
Police asked Rojas, who appeared to have been recently in a fight, to step 
outside so they could conduct a protective sweep and found Fernandez in the 
residence. 247  Fernandez refused police entry but police arrested him on 
suspicion of a domestic assault, and he was later identified as a member of 
the gang robbery.248 About an hour after Fernandez’s arrest and removal 
from the home, police returned to Rojas’ and Fernandez’s home, informed 
Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested and asked to search the apartment.249 
Police received both written and verbal consent from Rojas250 and the search 
produced evidence implicating Fernandez in the robbery. 251  Fernandez 
moved to suppress the evidence but was unsuccessful; he was found guilty 
on several charges and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.252 The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a co-tenant’s physical 
presence is necessary to deny consent to search. 253 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito noted that generally, consent 
searches are permissible when one tenant of a jointly occupied property 
provides consent. 254  However, in Randolph, the Court crafted a narrow 
exception to this rule, holding that “a physically present inhabitant’s express 
refusal of consent to a police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, 
regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”255 That is, when a co-tenant 
refuses police consent, that refusal is controlling and police may not search 
regardless of consent provided by other occupants. Alito noted, however, that 
the Randolph ruling dealt with a physically present tenant. 256  Here, 
Fernandez was not present when the police received consent to search from 
Rojas. The majority found that although Fernandez had objected earlier, his 
lack of physical presence during the time of the second entry into his home 
makes his prior denial of consent irrelevant.257 Rather, Randolph only applies 
as an exception to a consent search when the objecting party is physically 
present. Given that Fernandez had already been arrested and removed from 
the apartment and police obtained permission from Rojas, the search was 
valid under the Fourth Amendment.258 





250 Fernandez, 134 S.Ct. at 1130. 
251 Id. at 1131. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1132–33. 
255 Id. at 1133 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23) (alteration in original) 
(italics omitted). 
256 Id. at 1133–34. 
257 Id. at 1134. 
258 Id. at 1137. 
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Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.259 Ginsburg argued the Fourth Amendment 
was violated and that the case should have been viewed as nothing more than 
an application of Randolph.260 A faithful application would have resulted in 
the search being overturned. Ginsburg argued that the ruling significantly 
reduced the value of the exception provided in Randolph.261 
D.  Five-to-Four Decisions 
Marginally-winning coalitions decided four criminal justice cases 
during the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013–2014 Term.262 Despite three of these 
producing conservative outcomes, Justice Scalia was in the minority in all of 
four cases ending in five-member majorities. 263 As will be shown, Scalia’s 
dissents, in part, reveal how certain issue areas can lead some Justices to 
depart from their normal voting patterns and the care required in interpreting 
decisions as being either liberal or conservative. 
The Court’s ruling in Navarette v. California dealt with the 
reliability of an anonymous tip and law enforcement’s ability to conduct 
investigative stops based on such a tip.264 An anonymous caller informed a 
911 operator that a driver of a truck had just run her off the road.265 She 
provided the operator with the make and model of the truck, the license plate 
number, the vehicle’s direction and approximate location.266 Based on that 
information, California Highway Police a few minutes later stopped a truck 
fitting that profile. 267  As they approached the truck, police smelled 
marijuana, conducted an investigative search and found thirty pounds of 
marijuana.268 Defendants Lorenzo and Josa Navarette moved to have the 
evidence suppressed arguing that police did not have reasonable suspicion to 
conduct the investigative stop because the stop was based on nothing more 
                                                 
259 Id. at 1138 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Fernandez is one of only two criminal 
justice cases this Term in which Justice Kagan was not in the majority; the other was 
Navarette v. California. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). Justice Breyer was 
also in 19 of the 21 majorities analyzed in this Article. However, Breyer dissented in different 
cases than did Kagan. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014); White, 134 S. Ct. 
1697 (2014). This explains why, despite the high rate of majority participation by both Kagan 
and Breyer, the interagreement rate between these two Justices is only about average for the 
Court in non-unanimous cases decided during the 2013–2014 Term. See supra, Table 4). 
260 Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1139. 
261 Id. at 1141–42. 
262 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259; Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; Paroline, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1710; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986. 
263 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259; Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; Paroline, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1710. 
264 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683. 
265 Id. at 1686–87. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 1687. 
268 Id. 
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than an anonymous tip without collaboration.269 The trial court disagreed, the 
Navarettes pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and their case eventually 
reached the high court on appeal.270 
Justice Thomas, writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy, Alito and Breyer, found the search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.271 The Court held that the tip was sufficiently collaborated to 
justify the stop.272 The tip specified the make and model of the car and 
provided first hand eyewitness testimony of wrongdoing. 273  Further, the 
tipster had information regarding a potentially dangerous driver which this 
context lent further credence to the tip’s reliability.274 Based on the totality of 
the circumstances the tip was sufficiently collaborated; consequently, the 
brief investigative stop was justified and constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.275 
Justice Scalia, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, 
filed a dissent.276 Scalia noted that the Court had, in prior cases, required that 
evidence from anonymous tips be collaborated before being used as the basis 
of a search.277 Here, the tip was anonymous reducing its credibility.278 Scalia 
wrote that the tipster had “[p]lenty of time to dissemble or embellish,” such 
that the information did not rise to the level of common exceptions to the 
hearsay rule that permit an assumption of greater credibility to certain 
statements.279 Scalia maintained that through this decision, the Court created 
a new rule regarding anonymous tips that essentially holds that “an 
anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a possibly intoxicated highway 
driver provides without more the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a 
stop.”280 
In a complicated series of votes in Paroline v. United States, the 
Court held in a five-to-four conservative decision that victims of child 
pornography are entitled to restitution under the Violence Against Women 
Act from individuals who possess the pornographic images.281 However, the 
Court also held that individuals who possess the pornographic images cannot 
be held liable for the entire amount of the victim’s losses but are only 
                                                 
269 Id. 
270 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687. 
271 Id. at 1685. 
272 Id. at 1688–99. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 1689. 
275 Id. at 1692. 
276 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 1693–94. 
280 Id. at 1692. 
281 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1710. 
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required to pay restitution in proportion to his or her contributions to the 
victim’s losses.282 
Here, Doyle Paroline was arrested for having images of child 
pornography on his computer. Of the 150 to 300 images on his computer, 
two images were of the victim “Amy.”283 Amy had been sexually abused as a 
child by her uncle, and her images were put on the internet and widely 
circulated.284 Although there was, of course, no clear indication of how many 
of these images existed, Court documents indicated that Paroline was one of 
thousands of perpetrators who had pictures of the victim.285 Amy filed for 
restitution under the Violence Against Women Act and was awarded $3.4 
million by the lower courts; those courts held that Paroline was liable for 
Amy’s entire loss.286 Paroline appealed and the Court granted certiorari.287 
Writing for Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan and Alito, Justice 
Kennedy held that, although Paroline was liable for some of Amy’s losses, 
he was liable only for those caused by his individual behavior.288 Victims 
could thus collect damages from all those convicted of having the 
pornographic images. As Kennedy wrote, “it makes sense to spread payment 
among a larger number of offenders in amounts more closely in proportion to 
their respective causal roles and their own circumstances . . . .”289 Kennedy 
also stated that “[t]his would serve the twin goals of helping the victim 
achieve eventual restitution for all her child-pornography losses and 
impressing upon offenders the fact that child pornography crimes, even 
simple possession, affect real victims.” 290  Through the ruling, the Court 
upheld the general concept that victims of child pornography could obtain 
monetary damages, but adopted a moderate approach towards determining 
damages for any particular perpetrator. 291 
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, argued that the congressional statute authorizing restitution is 
flawed and as written does not allow for victims of child pornography to 
collect damages from those who possess the images.292 Rather, Chief Justice 
Roberts stated that while he agreed with the majority that child pornography 
victims should be able to receive monetary damages, he asserted the statute 
is poorly written to address the types of qualitative harm suffered by Amy 
                                                 
282 Id. at 1727. 
283 Id. at 1717–18. 
284 Id. at 1717. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 1718. 
287 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1718. 
288 Id. at 1720. 
289 Id. at 1729. 
290 Id. at 1727. 
291 Because this aspect of the ruling permits at least some restitution potentially 
from each identified perpetrator, we code the decision as conservative. 
292 Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1730 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
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from multiple offenders.293 Justices Roberts, Scalia and Thomas proposed 
giving Congress the opportunity to correct the law.294 
Justice Sotomayor dissented but for very different reasons than did 
the others.295 Arguing that Congress intended the perpetrators to be liable for 
the full amount of the victim’s losses, Sotomayor would have upheld the 
entire $3.4 million verdict against Paroline.296 
The Court’s conservative decision in favor of gun regulation in 
Abramski v. United States 297  again highlights the occasional difficulty 
encountered when classifying Supreme Court cases as either liberal or 
conservative. Because the decision in Abramski supports the government’s 
position and is rights-restrictive, it is conservative as defined here. However, 
in the broader political context, increasing the effectiveness of gun 
regulations is considered a liberal position. This inconsistency explains why 
Abramski is the first criminal justice decision in which Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Thomas, Alito and Scalia dissented from a conservative 
outcome.298 
In this case, Bruce Abramski offered to purchase a gun for his uncle 
and entered into an agreement, complete with prepayment, to do so.299 He 
then went to a federally licensed firearm dealer, filled out paperwork as the 
actual buyer of the gun, signed a statement acknowledging his understanding 
that lying on the federal paperwork was a federal crime, passed the 
background check, took possession of the weapon and then transferred the 
weapon to his uncle.300 Abramski was indicted for falsely asserting that he 
was the buyer of the weapon. Abramski eventually pleaded guilty but 
preserved his right to appeal.301 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine if straw purchases of weapons are permissible and to determine if 
the actual buyer of the weapon was Abramski or the intended owner, 
Abramski’s uncle.302 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan noted that the federal 
government has for 40 years regulated the sale of firearms to ensure that 
individuals who are ineligible to own weapons, like those with mental illness 
or drug addiction, do not obtain them.303 Kagan noted that allowing straw 
                                                 
293 Id. at 1732–33. 
294 Id. at 1735. 
295 Id. at 1735 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
296 Id. In this sense, Sotomayor took the most conservative position on the Court in 
this case by supporting the largest penalty. However, given the coding scheme, her vote 
against a conservative decision is categorized as liberal. 
297 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259. 
298 See supra note 46. 
299 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2264–65. 
300 Id. at 2265. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 2261–63. Justice Kagan, the most recent addition to the Court, has slowly 
increased her production of majority opinion authorship in non-unanimous criminal justice 
cases. During the 2013–2014 Term, she authored three such opinions—Rosemond v. United 
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purchases of weapons would render those firearm protections meaningless; if 
a convicted felon, for instance, could obtain a weapon simply by getting 
someone else to purchase it for him, the ability of the federal government to 
keep weapons out of the hands of undesirables would be limited 
needlessly.304 Therefore, the entire law, taken in context, must be understood 
to mean that the “actual buyer” of the weapon was the uncle and not 
Abramski.305 Therefore, Abramski falsely stated that he was a buyer and in 
so doing, violated federal law. 
Although Abramski’s uncle was eligible to purchase the gun, this 
fact was irrelevant because, as Kagan noted, those eligible to own weapons 
may still use a straw buyer to ensure that the weapon is not traced back to 
them if they are planning criminal activity.306 Justice Kagan’s opinion was 
joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg and Sotomayor. In dissent, 
Justice Scalia, writing for Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and 
Alito, argued that the plain meaning of the words indicate that Abramski was 
the buyer of the gun.307 Scalia maintained that the falsification by Abramski 
was not a fact material to the lawfulness of the purchase of the firearm 
because Abramski’s uncle was legally eligible to purchase the weapon.308 
The Term’s lone liberal, criminal justice decision decided five-to-
four was Hall v. Florida, 309  which again revealed Justice Kennedy’s 
importance in death penalty cases.310 In Hall, Kennedy provided a critical, 
swing vote necessary for a liberal outcome.311 
Hall addressed the implementation of the Court’s ruling in Atkins v. 
Virginia312  which prohibited as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments the execution of those deemed to be developmentally 
disabled 313  but left to states to define that threshold. The issue in Hall 
                                                                                                                   
States, Kaley v. United States, and Abramski v. United States. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1240; 
Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1090; Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259. During the 2012–2013 Term, Kagan 
wrote only two non-unanimous criminal justice opinions. See 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, 
at 40. And she authored only a single such opinion during the preceding Term. See 2011–2012 
Term supra note 14, at 247). 
304 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2267–68. 
305 Id. at 2272. 
306 Id. at 2268–69. 
307 Id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
308 Id. at 2275–76. 
309 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986. 
310 See, e.g., Christopher Dunn, Justice Kennedy: The Man in Control of the Death 
Penalty, 238 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2007); Barnes, supra note 58; Linda E. Carter, The Evolution of 
Justice Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Capital Cases, 
44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 229 (2013). 
311 All four remaining conservative Justices dissented in this case. Hall, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2001 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
312 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
313 In Atkins the Court used the phrase “mental retardation” to describe those with 
significantly subpar intellectual abilities. The language has changed and the Court uses the 
new descriptor “intellectual disability” instead. We remain consistent with the Court’s new 
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concerned the process by which Florida determined whether or not an 
individual’s developmental disability met the threshold for exclusion from 
death penalty eligibility. 
Florida law required that an individual score a 70 or lower on a 
standard IQ test—where 100 is considered average and a score of 70 falls 
about two standard deviations below this mean—in order to be considered 
developmentally disabled to an extent that made the individual ineligible for 
capital punishment.314 If the individual scores above a 70, even if that score 
falls within the test’s standard error of measurement (SEM), no further 
analysis is needed and the individual cannot be deemed sufficiently 
developmentally disabled. 315  For Florida, a score of 70 or lower was a 
threshold requirement before other evidence of developmental disability 
could be considered.316 
In 1978, Freddie Lee Hall and his accomplice murdered Karol Hurst 
after kidnapping, beating and raping her. 317  They then killed a sheriff’s 
deputy and Hall received the death penalty.318 
The Supreme Court ruled in 1987 that death penalty candidates must 
be allowed to present non-statutory mitigating evidence during sentencing; 
Hall’s death sentence was re-litigated. 319  During these hearings, Hall 
presented significant evidence of developmental disability but the jury 
nevertheless imposed the death penalty. 320  In 2002, following the high 
court’s determination that those who are developmentally disabled could not 
be executed, Hall again challenged his death sentence.321 Although Hall had 
taken nine IQ tests resulting in scores ranging from 60–80, the sentencing 
court considered only those scores above 70. Because these did not meet the 
threshold required by Florida law for sufficient developmental disability, the 
Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall’s appeal, upholding his death 
sentence.322 
Justice Kennedy (writing also for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan 
and Sotomayor) found Florida’s use of a strict 70 IQ score cutoff in 
determining developmental disability to be a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. 323  Kennedy first noted that protections against cruel and 
unusual punishments must be evaluated using the “evolving standards of 
                                                                                                                   
language and also use intellectual disability when referring to what was previously termed 
mental retardation. 
314 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1994–95. 
315 Id. at 1994–95. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. at 1990. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 1991. 
320 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1991. 
321 Id. at 1991-92. 
322 Id. at 1992. 
323 Id. at 2000–01. 
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decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” 324  and by this 
standard, Kennedy found that Florida’s use of a strict cut-off ignored 
established medical practices. 325  Kennedy wrote, “The professionals who 
design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have agreed, for years now, that IQ 
test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a range.”326 
Further, Kennedy held that by failing to take the standard error into 
consideration, Florida’s formulation ran contrary to what a majority of states 
use in implementing Atkins.327 Kennedy found, “The rejection of the strict 70 
cutoff in the vast majority of States and the ‘consistency in the trend’ toward 
recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence of consensus that our society 
does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane.”328 
Moreover, Kennedy noted that the ruling in Atkins itself appears to 
reject the use of a strict cutoff.329 Based then on the guidance provided by the 
medical professionals, the states, and Atkins, Kennedy found Florida’s 
scheme for implementing Atkins to be unconstitutional and a threshold 
requirement of a test score of 70 without considering other factors such as 
measurement error to be unsound. 330  As Kennedy noted, “Intellectual 
disability is a condition, not a number.”331 
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion332 that was joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Alito found the Florida 
scheme consistent with the Constitution, in part because the state used 
multiple test scores which, according to Alito, accounted for the risk of 
measurement error. 333  Alito urged the Court not to impose a national 
standard for the implementing the mandates of Atkins. 334  That 
recommendation is consistent with the general tendency among the 
dissenters to defer to conservative positions articulated at the state level.335 
                                                 
324 Id. at 1992 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
325 Hall, 134 S. Ct at 1994–95. 
326 Id. at 1995. 
327 Id. at 1996. 
328 Id. at 1998. 
329 Id. at 1999. 
330 Id. at 2000–1. 
331 Hall, 134 S. Ct at 2001. 
332 Id. at 2001 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
333 Id. at 2011. 
334 Id. at 2002. 
335 See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Alito’s Dissents Show Deference 
to Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/03/
politics/politicsspecial1/03legal.html?ei (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (reviewing Alito’s 
tendencies as a judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals); Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 97 (2011) 
(Thomas, J. dissenting) (criticizing the majority for rejecting the judgments of legislatures and 
state courts in a case involving life sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide 
offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for disregarding decisions by state legislators and the prevalence of 
statutes allowing juveniles to be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole). 
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IV.  DISCUSSION OF SELECT THEMES AND TRENDS 
The foregoing quantitative336 and qualitative337 analyses reveal some 
recurring trends with respect to criminal justice decisions, and suggest the 
possibility of some new, emerging ones as well. The 2013–2014 U.S. 
Supreme Court Term witnessed such decision-making tendencies at both the 
Court and individual-Justice level. We begin with a discussion of key 
patterns characterizing positions taken by individual members of the Court. 
A.  Individual-Level Patterns 
The most recent term again demonstrated the influential role played 
by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy’s historic record this term of being 
on the winning side of every criminal justice decision338 differs only slightly 
from his voting tendencies in criminal justice cases decided by the Roberts 
Court in previous terms; during the first nine years of the Roberts Court, 
Kennedy voted with the majority in over 90% of all criminal justice cases—
far more often than did any other Justice.339 This helps explain why scholars 
and other Court watchers find that Kennedy often commands a 
disproportionate amount of attention from both advocates before the Court 
and from his fellow Justices, especially in closely divided cases.340 We see 
no reason to expect this to change in the near future. 
Kennedy’s role in providing a critical fifth vote was especially 
apparent during the 2013–2014 Term. This was in part because none of the 
marginally-winning coalitions in criminal justice cases consisted of all five 
members of the conservative wing aligned against the four more liberal 
Justices. In these cases ending in five-to-four decisions, Kennedy joined the 
four members of the liberal wing to uphold regulations on gun purchases, 
helped preserve a narrow conservative majority when Scalia dissented in a 
Fourth Amendment case involving an anonymous tip, and authored the 
Court’s decision establishing certain parameters of victim compensation 
under the Violence Against Women Act that produced an unusual majority 
                                                 
336 See supra Part II. 
337 See supra Part III. 
338 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
339 See supra Table 2; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40; 2011–2012 Term, 
supra note 14, at 247; 2010–2011 Term, supra note 14, at 327–42; 2009–2010 Term, supra 
note 14, at 234; 2008–2009 Term, supra note 14, at 7; 2007–2008 Term, supra note 14, at 50–
85; 2006–2007 Term, supra note 14, at 1015–42; and 2005–2006 Term, supra note 14, at 519–
45. 
340 See, e.g., RYAN A. MALPHURS, RHETORIC AND DISCOURSE IN SUPREME COURT 
ORAL ARGUMENTS: SENSEMAKING IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 98 (2013); Barnes, supra note 44; 
Richard Wolf, From Gay Marriage to Voting Law, Kennedy is the Key, USA TODAY, (June 
27, 2013, 11:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supreme-
court-athony-kennedy-race-voting-abortion-gay-marriage/2161701/. 
38
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/1
2015] 2013–2014 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  399 
configuration including Justices Kennedy, Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg and 
Kagan. 341 
Notably, Kennedy also provided an outcome-determining swing vote 
in an important death penalty case during the 2013–2014 Term, 342 as he has 
in several other capital punishment cases in past years.343 
Breyer was the only Justice other than Kennedy to vote with the 
majority in all criminal justice cases decided by a marginally-winning 
coalition during the 2013–2014 Term, and it was in these cases that one of 
the more striking tendencies in Justice Breyer’s voting behavior in criminal 
justice matters reappears. 344  Namely, Navarette v. California serves as 
another example of Justice Breyer providing a conservative vote in a Fourth 
Amendment case while Justice Scalia voted with members of the liberal 
wing.345 Justice Breyer’s longstanding support of law enforcement interests 
on such issues demonstrates the challenge confronting the other members of 
the liberal bloc in search and seizure cases, even when able to persuade one 
of the more conservative Justices to join them. 
However, the importance of Justice Scalia’s willingness to defect 
from his fellow conservatives should not be minimized. Scalia’s recent string 
                                                 
341 Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2259; see supra notes 297–308 and accompanying text; 
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; see supra notes 264–280 and accompanying text; Paroline, 134 
S. Ct. at 1710; see supra notes 281–296; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986. See supra note 309 and 
accompanying text. 
342 Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
343 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the imposition 
of capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age of 18 years is 
unconstitutional); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (barring the execution of 
prisoners who do not have a rational understanding of the reason for their execution); Brewer 
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007) (finding the lower court erred in denying relief after a 
jury was prevented from meaningfully considering relevant mitigating evidence); Abdul-Kabir 
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007) (finding the state’s jury instructions for capital sentencing 
to be inadequate); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007) (finding the lower court erred when 
evaluating whether an unconstitutional jury instruction invalidated a death sentence). Kennedy 
also wrote for four liberal Justices in Graham v. Florida, which held that it was 
unconstitutional to sentence juvenile offenders to life imprisonment without parole for non-
homicide offenses. Grahan, 560 U.S. at 48. Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence made 
Graham a six-to-three decision. 
344 See supra Part III.D. 
345 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683; see, e.g., King, 133 S. Ct. at 1958 (holding that it 
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to take without a warrant a cheek swab for DNA 
analysis of someone held in custody after being arrested for a serious offense based on 
probable cause, ending in the same line up of Justices as Navarette); Florida v. Jardines, 133 
S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (finding that police use of a drug-sniffing dog on the porch of a home was 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and consequently required a search 
warrant, ending in a liberal decision in which Scalia and Thomas voted with the three women 
on the Court and Breyer supported law enforcement interests in dissent); Jacob Gershman, 
The Fourth Amendment’s Strange Bedfellows, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, June 3, 2013 6:34 PM, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/06/03/the-fourth-amendments-strange-bedfellows/ (quoting 
Orin Kerr of George Washington University Law School, ‘“Justice Scalia has been on the 
defense side of every non-unanimous Fourth Amendment case” while Justice Breyer has come 
down on the side of the government.’).. 
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of votes and opinions in which he joined his liberal colleagues in supporting 
Fourth Amendment rights may be due to his purported “longstanding 
libertarian streak in some civil liberties cases.”346 With his claimed adherence 
to an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, 347  Scalia’s 
decisions concerning constitutional rights in criminal justice most frequently 
support assertions of authority by police and prosecutors rather than rights 
claims by suspects and defendants. 348  Scalia’s understanding of the 
Constitution’s original meaning, however, has led in recent terms to his 
outspoken support for protecting Fourth Amendment rights in prominent 
decisions concerning search and seizure.349 In United States v. Jones, Scalia 
wrote the majority opinion declaring that the use of a GPS tracking device on 
a suspected drug trafficker’s car constituted a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment that required authorization by a warrant or other permissible 
justification. 350  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Florida v. Jardines 
similarly barred police officers without a warrant from seeking evidence by 
bringing a drug-sniffing dog to the front door of a home in order to 
investigate a suspected drug house.351 He also joined the Court’s liberals 
when he wrote a strong dissenting opinion in Maryland v. King against the 
majority’s approval of a state statute authorizing mandatory DNA sample 
extractions from unconvicted individuals arrested for certain serious 
crimes.352 Similarly, in Missouri v. McNeely, Scalia voted to require police 
officers to seek a warrant when possible before drawing blood samples from 
suspected drunk drivers notwithstanding the state’s arguments that 
warrantless blood draws are essential because of the rapid disappearance of 
evidence (i.e., natural reduction of blood alcohol level) over time.353 In the 
2013–2014 Term, Scalia continued this recent trend of outspoken support for 
Fourth Amendment rights with his dissenting opinion, joined by the Court’s 
most liberal Justices, in Navarette v. California354 that objected to reliance on 
an anonymous tip as the basis for a police traffic stop.355 Although it is too 
soon to judge whether these cases reflect changes in Scalia’s approach to 
                                                 
346 See supra note accompanying text 345; Scott Lemieux, Scalia Gets It Right, 
AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, (June 3, 2013), prospect.org/article/scalia-gets-it-right. 
347 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 38 (1997). 
348 Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi M. McCall, Antonin Scalia: Outspoken and 
Influential Originalist, in CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CHRISTINA DEJONG & MICHAEL 
M. MCCALL, eds., THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169 (2011). 
349 See, e.g., Lemieux, supra note 346 (noting Scalia’s dissenting opinion against 
mandatory extraction of DNA samples from arrestees in Maryland v. King). 
350 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
351 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409, 1417–18. 
352 King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
353 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013). 
354 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
355 See supra notes 276–280 and accompanying text. 
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understanding the Fourth Amendment356 or merely a flurry of specific issues 
that call forth his preexisting viewpoints on situations in which protections 
against improper searches should exist, 357  the recent term helped to 
demonstrate that his recent role as a protector of Fourth Amendment rights 
continues. 
While Scalia remains a dependable conservative on most other 
criminal justice issues, his conservative voting record lags significantly 
behind that of Justice Alito who has now posted the highest percent 
conservative voting in criminal justice cases in seven of the last eight 
terms.358 During the 2013–2014 Term, Alito seemed especially inclined to 
call for deference to state court decisions.359 Such use of deference in support 
of law enforcement interests echoes arguments commonly made in the past 
by Justices Thomas360 and Scalia.361 Thus, it seems likely that interpretational 
preferences regarding certain views of states’ rights and judicial constraint 
will continue to be expressed frequently on the Court for the foreseeable 
future to justify particular conservative positions in the area of criminal 
justice. 
                                                 
356 There is evidence that Scalia changed his interpretive approach with respect to 
one criminal justice issue: prisoners’ rights. Initially, Scalia’s prisoners’ rights decisions 
appeared to involve strategic and controversial characterizations of precedents as a means to 
shape new doctrines without reference to his usual claim of following originalism. Christopher 
E. Smith, The Malleability of Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic Impact on Prisoners’ 
Rights, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 73, 84–87, 89–95 (2001). However, Scalia later switched to 
more consistent application of his claimed adherence to originalism after he was apparently 
persuaded to do so by Justice Thomas’s strong assertion of an originalism perspective in such 
cases. Jan Crawford Greenburg, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 120 (2007). 
357 There were earlier Fourth Amendment cases in which Scalia strongly 
supported individual rights, thus indicating that certain issues elicited a rights-protective 
viewpoint from him. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (Scalia-authored 
majority opinion, joined by the Court’s most liberal justices, forbidding police officers from 
warrantless movement of electronic items in plain view in order to see if their serial numbers 
provided evidence that they were stolen); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (Scalia-
authored majority opinion forbidding warrantless use of heat-detection device pointed at 
outside of home in order to investigate whether the home contained lights used for indoor 
cultivation of marijuana). 
358 During the 2011–2012 Term, Justice Thomas held the most conservative voting 
record in criminal justice cases. In all other years since the 2006–2007 Term, Alito has held 
that position. See supra note 34 and accompanying table; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14. 
359 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 67 (noting deference as a justification 
for Alito’s majority opinion in Burt v. Titlow regarding an ineffective counsel claim); and 
supra text accompanying note 333 and accompanying text (noting Alito’s dissent in Hall v. 
Florida, in which he urged the Court to avoid imposing a national implementation standard 
for determining the cognitive development of those facing the death penalty). 
360 See, e.g., Joyce A. Baugh, Clarence Thomas: Consistent, Conservative, & 
Contrarian, in CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CHRISTINA DEJONG & MICHAEL M. 
MCCALL, eds., THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 231, 237-8, 240-1 
(2011). 
361 See, e.g., Smith & McCall, supra note 348, at 174. 
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At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justice Sotomayor 
posted for the third consecutive term either the most or second most liberal 
voting rate (behind Ginsburg) in criminal justice cases decided by the 
Court. 362  This suggests that Sotomayor may be Ginsburg’s increasingly 
likely heir as the leading liberal voice on the Court. 363  Moreover, the 
tendency of Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg and Kagan to support liberal 
positions and to agree with one another—in criminal justice and other 
cases—has generated substantial interest in this liberal bloc of three 
women.364 Ginsburg, herself, seems to have suggested that the importance of 
this bloc may affect her decision on whether or not to retire.365 
B.  Court-Level Patterns 
A seemingly paradoxical set of themes characterized the 2013–2014 
Term with respect to broader voting patterns in criminal justice cases. First, 
an unusually high portion of cases decided unanimously blurred some of the 
typically clear distinctions between the liberal and conservative wings of the 
Court.366 Given the degree to which this distribution contrasts with those in 
prior terms, it seems prudent at this juncture to interpret the level of 
consensus during the most recent term as a product of the idiosyncratic mix 
of issues decided rather than as the sign of an emerging trend.367 Second, 
other indicators suggest the ideological divide on the Court not only 
                                                 
362 See supra Table 2; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40; 2011–2012 Term, 
supra note 14, at 247. 
363 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Signals She Has No 
Plans to Retire Soon, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-
ginsburg-20140921-story.html#page=1 (“At 81, Ginsburg has emerged as the Court’s liberal 
leader . . . . [A]s she begins her 22nd year on the high court, Ginsburg is at the height of her 
influence and public acclaim.”); Some judicial scholars over the last few years have suggested 
that Sotomayor eventually might assume such a role. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & April 
Sanford, The Roberts Court and Wrongful Convictions, 32 ST. LOUIS U PUB. L. REV. 307, 315 
(2013) (contemplating Sotomayor’s potential role in wrongful conviction cases given the 
retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens—the Court’s previous, leading liberal voice on the 
topic); David Fontana, Sonia Sotomayor: How She Became the Public Face of the Supreme 
Court’s Liberal Wing, NEW REPUBLIC, June 29, 2011, http://www.newrepublic.com/article
/politics/91013/sonia-sotomayor-supreme-court-liberal-voice (asserting that Sotomayor’s 
reliably liberal vote on a variety of issues and her engaging style makes her an especially 
likely leader of the liberal wing in the eyes of the public). 
364 See supra Tables 2, 3 and 4; see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Three Justices Bound by 
Beliefs, Not Just Gender, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/us/
bound-together-on-the-court-but-by-beliefs-not-gender.html?_r=0. 
365 Amy Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Retirement Dissent, THE NEW YORKER, 
Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-retire
ment-dissent (quoting Ginsburg response from an interview with Elle Magazine, “When 
Sandra [Day O’Connor] left, I was all alone. I’m rather small, so when I go with all these men 
in this tiny room. Now Kagan is on my left, and Sotomayor is on my right. So we look like 
we’re really part of the Court and we’re here to stay.”). 
366 See supra Table 1; see supra Table 2 and accompanying text. 
367 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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persisted, but may have hardened somewhat. For example, the unusually 
large number of voting blocs that emerged this term show that most Justices 
voted with other members of their respective wing at very high rates, with 
only a couple of Justices falling outside of a traditional bloc. 368 The low 
level of agreement among members of different camps in non-unanimous 
decisions and the tendency of such decisions to align the most conservative 
Justices against the most liberal ones, may jeopardize the perceived 
legitimacy of the Court if the public increasingly comes to see the Court’s 
decisions as products of an ideological divide. As one long-time Court 
observer warned, “The perception that partisan politics has infected the 
court’s work may do lasting damage to its prestige and authority and to 
Americans’ faith in the rule of law.”369 
A particularly interesting set of findings this term regard the 
potentially strategic use of opinion assignments by the Chief Justice.370 For 
example, Roberts assigned the writing of all five liberal, unanimous 
decisions to conservative Justices. 371  While several factors undoubtedly 
influenced these choices by the Chief Justice, by assigning liberal decisions 
to the Court’s more conservative members, Roberts likely minimized the 
chances of defection from unanimous rulings, while limiting the degree of 
liberalism of some opinions, thereby reducing the degree to which the 
resulting policies diverged from his preferred positions.372 
Evidence for such motivations seems strongest in unanimous 
opinions that Roberts self-assigned.373 In writing the Court’s much awaited 
opinion in Bond v. United States, for example, Roberts avoided further 
exposing the divide on the Court regarding constitutional interpretations by 
resolving the case on statutory grounds issues arising from an act 
implementing a treaty. 374  This not only preserved unanimity at least in 
judgment, but also likely limited the expression of more liberal 
                                                 
368 See supra Tables 3 and 4; See also supra note 30 and accompanying text 
(showing that Breyer’s voting tendencies did not place him in a liberal voting bloc, nor did 
Kennedy’s align strongly with those of other conservatives though he did vote often with 
certain members of the liberal wing). 
369 Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES (N.Y. edition) (May 11, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=
1. 
370 LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT, 125 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that the 
Chief Justice assigns the Court’s opinion when he is in the majority). 
371 See supra note 122. 
372 See, e.g., Sandra L. Wood, Linda Camp Keith, Drew Noble Lanier, & Ayo 
Ogundele, Opinion Assignment and the Chief Justice: 1988–1940, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 798, 798–
800 (2000) (summarizing traditional models explaining opinion assignment choices). 
373 Such cases possess added relevance in that for the second year in a row, Chief 
Justice Roberts did not author a single non-unanimous criminal justice decision. See supra 
Parts III.B–D; 2012–2013 Term, supra note 14, at 40. 
374 See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2077; see supra notes 184–193 and accompanying text. 
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interpretations of sweeping congressional powers than if the constitutional 
issues had been the focus.375 
A similar example also illustrates the purported tendency of Chief 
Justice John Roberts to seek incremental change in legal doctrine rather than 
support reversals of precedent that lead to sudden and dramatic redefinitions 
of the law and constitutional rights. 376  Further, this approach reportedly 
frustrates his conservative allies who want to move faster in reworking the 
law to fit their visions of proper constitutional interpretation.377 Consistent 
with these reports, evidence emerged in a criminal justice case in the 2013–
2014 Term to support these observations. In McCullen v. Coakley, 
concerning the free speech rights of anti-abortion protesters, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion struck down the restrictive Massachusetts law but 
left in place other precedents concerning the possibility of time, place, and 
manner restrictions on protests outside abortion clinics.378 By contrast, in his 
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expressed frustration with the Roberts 
majority opinion for failing to also overrule other precedents that left in place 
possible restrictions on abortion clinic protests.379 
For purposes of criminal justice law and policy, the development 
during the 2013–2014 Term that could be most significant if it continues 
concerns the small number of criminal justice cases accepted for decision.380 
The Roberts Courts has received considerable attention and criticism for its 
pursuit of an activist agenda aimed at reworking law to support conservative 
political values and policy preferences. 381  It may be that the majority’s 
purportedly agenda-driven attention382 to other continuing disputed matters 
of law and policy, such as voting rights,383 same-sex marriage,384 and health-
                                                 
375 Admittedly, such expressions may have been limited to dissents. 
376 Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme Court, supra note 12. 
377 Adam Liptak, Roberts’s Incremental Approach Frustrates Supreme Court 
Allies, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/us/supreme-court-
shows-restraint-in-voting-to-overrule-precedents.html. This point also applies to Roberts’s 
opinion in Bond to which a disgruntled Scalia authored a concurring opinion (see supra notes 
194–206 and accompanying text). 
378 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537. 
379 Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
380 See supra notes 14–19, and supra Table 1 and accompanying text. 
381 See Editorial, Activism and the Roberts Court, N.Y TIMES, March 29, 2012, at 
A26; Anne Marie Lofaso, Judicial Activism on the Roberts Court: Anti-Union Ideology 
Driving Analysis, AM. CON. SOC. BLOG (July 2, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog
/judicial-activism-on-the-roberts-court-anti-union-ideology-driving-the-analysis; Adam 
Liptak, Court Is ‘One of Most Activist,’ Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
2013, at A1; Noah Feldman, Roberts Court Cloaks Activism in Complexity, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-10-16/
roberts-court-cloaks-activism-in-complexity. 
382 Supra note 372. 
383 Adam Liptak, Justices Enter Into Dispute Over Districts Alabama Set, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A12. 
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care reform, 385  will lead to less attention to criminal justice issues in 
subsequent terms. If the trend toward accepting fewer criminal justice cases 
continues, those cases that are reviewed and the issues they raise will gain 
added significance. Under such circumstances, future assessments might 
expect the mix of questions reaching the Court to change as the opportunities 
for Justices to weigh and express competing interpretations of due process, 
the reasonableness of police behavior, and other criminal justice issues 
become more constrained. These and other potential implications of patterns 
emerging from the Court’s criminal justice decisions during the 2013–2014 
Term remain to be seen. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although it is difficult to know if voting data for any individual term 
manifested key characteristics that serve as harbingers of future terms, the 
individual decisions during every term are important as they establish 
precedents for judges and other actors in the system to follow. 386 Moreover, 
individual Justices’ opinions and case outcomes may, when analyzed in light 
of other decisions from recent terms, raise important questions about 
developments occurring at the high court.387 
Despite the continued shrinking of the Supreme Court docket,388 the 
2013–2014 Term produced important decisions in the area of criminal justice 
likely to have lasting effects. 389  Some questions like those regarding a 
defendant’s qualifications to receive the death penalty sharply divided the 
                                                                                                                   
384 Adam Liptak, Both Sides in Gay Marriage Fight in Utah Agree: Supreme 
Court Should Hear Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/
us/politics/utah-gay-marriage-lawyers-ask-supreme-court-to-act.html. 
385 Adam Liptak, Birth Control Order Deepens Divide Among Justices, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/us/politics/supreme-court-order-
suspends-contraception-rule-for-christian-college.html. 
386 See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text (“[I]t is likely that recent 
swings in the share of criminal justice cases decided unanimously are pushed more by the 
different grouping of issues heard in various Terms than by fundamental changes in the 
general level of agreement on the Court.”). 
387 For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014), concerning family-owned corporations’ option to avoid covering 
contraceptives in employee medical coverage is seen by critics as part of a pattern of Supreme 
Court decisions that increasingly denigrate women’s rights while simultaneously showing 
greater support for the rights of gays and lesbians. Adam Liptak, Justices’ Rulings Advance 
Gays; Women Less So, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2014, at A1. 
388 See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
389 For example, of the 11 “key” decisions issued by the Supreme Court during the 
2013–2014 Term as identified by The New York Times, three involved criminal justice related 
cases. See Key Supreme Court Decisions 2014, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/19/us/major-supreme-court-decisions-in-
2014.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%222%22%3A%22RI%3A18%
22. These are McCullen v. Coakley, Riley v. California, and Hall v. Florida. See supra notes 
144–160; supra notes 123–143 and accompany text; supra notes 309–335 and accompanying 
text. 
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Court, 390  while others found broad consensus such as when the Court 
considered privacy expectations in an increasingly technology-driven 
society.391 
Findings suggest several potentially fertile areas for judicial scholars 
to examine more rigorously. For example, Roberts’s criminal justice opinion 
assignments—especially to himself—seem to justify the label of ‘skillful 
strategist’ that some have applied to the Chief Justice.392 Further research 
might explore the degree to which strategic considerations not only explain 
the distribution of criminal justice opinion authorship across different 
Justices, but also the scope of decisions produced. This appears to be 
particularly instructive given Roberts’s presumed preference for slow, 
incremental changes to legal doctrine, at least on certain issues.393 
Subsequent examinations also might gauge whether the influence of 
the Court’s more ideologically consistent voters (e.g., Alito among 
conservatives and Sotomayor among liberals)394 increases or decreases if the 
current ideological divide on the Court persists, and especially if it widens. 
Relatedly, students of the judiciary may wish to closely monitor public 
opinion regarding the perceived legitimacy of the Court, particularly if 
voting alignments lead to a growing sense that the Court’s criminal justice 
and other decisions are products of partisan differences. 
 Kennedy’s presence in all of the Court’s majorities in criminal 
justice cases this Term underscores his role not only as the Court’s median 
voter but also as its leading swing voter.395 The degree to which the liberal 
bloc can garner Kennedy’s support likely will continue to be an important 
predictor of the direction of future Supreme Court decisions in criminal 
justice cases. However, one should not overlook the importance of Scalia, 
Breyer and other Justices who might provide an outcome-determining vote in 
any given case as the issues addressed and agreement among groups of 
Justices undoubtedly will shift—even if only subtly—from term to term. 
                                                 
390 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986. 
391 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473. 
392 E.g., Adam Liptak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1. 
393 See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
394 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
395 See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 33; Lane, supra note 44. 
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